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This Article examines how two recent cases, F.T.C. v. Actavis and
Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises Inc. could affect both the equitable de-
fense of patent misuse and the patent-antitrust interface more gener-
ally. It begins by tracing the history of patent misuse and its
reformulation into an “antitrust-lite” doctrine by the Federal Circuit.
This Article presents new empirical data confirming this reformulation,
and unveils the surprising influence of the Seventh Circuit and the Chi-
cago School on that reformulation. The Article then explores Actavis
and Kimble. It explains why Actavis will catalyze more antitrust chal-
lenges when patent rights are exercised, and why it also challenges the
Federal Circuit’s formulation of patent misuse. The Article proceeds to
observe Kimble’s misunderstanding of the patent policy underpinning
the Supreme Court’s prohibition against post-expiration royalties. This
Article confronts three key objections to a revival of misuse—its vague-
ness, lax standing requirements and punitive effects on patentees—and
explains why these objections are misplaced. The Article concludes by
recommending that judges and attorneys use the opportunity provided
by Actavis to develop a more thoughtful framework for patent misuse
that draws upon the strengths of its roots in patent policy and its inter-
face with antitrust policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In F.T.C. v. Actavis, the U.S. Supreme Court recently revitalized the
debate on how the law should operationalize policy dichotomies underlying
the patent-antitrust interface.1 The Court held that “pay-for-delay” settle-
ments between patent-owning drug companies and their generic competitors
could be anticompetitive even if these settlements were within the scope of
the owners’ patent rights.2 The Actavis decision has been hailed as poten-
tially “one of the most important patent/antitrust rulings of all time,”3 recog-
1. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). See also generally Herbert
Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust Policy: A Brief Historical Overview (Univ. of Iowa Legal Stud-
ies, Working Paper No. 05-31, 2005),  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
869417 (describing the early twentieth century as “an era of IP expansion and antitrust accom-
modation,” to “antitrust aggressiveness” “beginning during the New Deal and extending
through the Warren era [where] the Supreme Court was more inclined to view patents as
inherently anticompetitive and to interpret the antitrust laws expansively,” to the 1960s and
1970s, when antitrust was scaled back to focus “on identifying serious threats to competition
that were not justified by explicit provisions of the IP laws,” to the present when “we once
again live in an era of IP expansionism.”).
2. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2226, 2230.
3. Michael Carrier, The U.S. Supreme Court Issues First Ruling on Antitrust Legality
of Reverse-payment Drug Patent Settlements (Actavis), E-COMPETITIONS BULLETIN (July
2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2293867; see also Supreme Court
Issues Significant Patent Antitrust Decision Rejecting the “Scope of the Patent” Rule, PERKINS
COIE (June 18, 2013), http://www.perkinscoie.com/news/pubs_Detail.aspx?publication=
869018d4-0267-49b4-8c26-991255646b19 (describing Actavis as “the most significant patent
antitrust decision in decades. . . .”).
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nition that its impact exceeds the narrow regulatory confines of the Hatch-
Waxman Act.4
Shortly after in Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises Inc., the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declared that an agreement requiring Marvel to
pay royalties for patent license covering a Spider-Man “Web Shooter” be-
yond the patent’s term was unenforceable.5 The Ninth Circuit did so “reluc-
tantly,” expressing that it was bound by the Supreme Court’s controversial
decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co.6
Commentary on Actavis has focused overwhelmingly on the Court’s ap-
plication of antitrust law’s rule of reason to “pay-for-delay” settlements, the
resulting need to assess patent validity and infringement, and whether anti-
trust incursion into a properly obtained patent monopoly was orthodox.7 In
contrast to the heated debate generated by Actavis, Kimble has attracted little
4. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the
Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 3, 22 (2014) (“A striking part
of Justice Breyer’s discussion of Supreme Court precedent was its showing that restraints
involving patents whose validity or coverage was not in dispute could nevertheless run afoul of
the Sherman Act, and outside of the Hatch-Waxman context.”); Mark Botti & Jessica Hoke,
Redefining the Border between Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Implications of FTC v.
Actavis, BLOOMBERG LAW (2013), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/
redefining-the-border-between-intellectual-property-and-antitrust/ (“For intellectual property
and antitrust counselors in the U.S., the implications from Actavis will need to be carefully
considered. Even more care needs to be exercised in settling patent disputes between competi-
tors or potential competitors. The activities of PAEs or patent trolls warrant closer antitrust
scrutiny. And terms and conditions in licensing agreements, even where unilaterally negotiated
by a single patent holder, may no longer be protected from challenge under the antitrust laws.
Licensing agreements embodying terms or arising in circumstances that might raise significant
antitrust issues if employed outside of the patent licensing context now clearly warrant some
careful consideration in the patent licensing context, even if they fall within the scope of the
patent.”).
5. Kimble v. Marvel Enters. Inc., 727 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2013).
6. Id. at 857 (citing Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964)); see e.g., Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari at 2, Kimble v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 727 F.3d 856 (2013) ( No. 13-720)
(“Petitioners respectfully ask this Court to overrule Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964),
App. 73-85, and to reject its per se prohibition on licensing arrangements involving post-
expiration patent royalties. . . . Brulotte, now approaching its half-century anniversary, has not
withstood the test of time. Other competition law decisions from that era have been updated by
this Court in light of a keener awareness of economics and real world business circumstances,
with rigid per se rules, unequal to the realities of the marketplace, supplanted with analysis
under the rule of reason. It is now Brulotte’s turn. . . . ”); see also 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET
AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW § 3.3 (2d ed. 2013) (“While Brulotte itself did not invoke the patent misuse
doctrine, merely speaking of the merely speaking of the unenforceability of the royalty agree-
ment itself, term extension has been accepted into the canon of patent misuse.”).
7. See e.g. Dana A. Elfin, Experts Say High Court’s Reverse Payments Ruling May
Have Far-Reaching Implications, 86 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.(BNA), No. 2123
(July 26, 2013); Aaron S. Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, ANTITRUST MAGAZINE, Fall 2013, at
16.; Thomas F. Cotter, FTC v. Actavis, Inc.: When Is the Rule of Reason Not the Rule of
Reason?, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 41 (2014) (analyzing the rule of reason under Actavis).
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attention beyond a few amicus briefs urging the Court to grant certiorari and
overrule Brulotte.8 This Article fills an important gap in the literature by
explaining the interrelated implications of Actavis and Kimble for the future
of patent misuse9 and the patent-antitrust interface.
Part I presents the methodology for much of the original empirical data
study appearing in this study. The discussion draws upon two sources. The
first source is quantitative—a comprehensive study of every case substan-
tively discussing patent misuse and antitrust law from the federal district and
appellate circuit courts, as well as the Supreme Court. These hand-coded
cases span the sixty-one years between January 1953, the effective date of
the 1952 Patent Act, and ending December 2013.10 The second source is
qualitative. It presents in-depth interviews with leading federal judges, gov-
ernment officials, attorneys and academics familiar with patent misuse and
antitrust law.
Part II traces key moments in the history of patent misuse, presenting
new empirical evidence that confirms the Federal Circuit’s role in the de-
cline of patent misuse, and unveils the influence of the Seventh Circuit and
the Chicago School of antitrust in shaping conventional wisdom on patent
misuse.
Part III analyzes Actavis and Kimble. It explains why Actavis was cor-
rect both as a matter of law and judicial rulemaking. It considers the re-
emergence of a patent-skeptical Supreme Court, and its implications for the
patent-antitrust interface and patent misuse. It also observes that while the
Ninth Circuit in Kimble reached the correct result, it misapplied patent mis-
use and overlooked its function as a patent policy lever.
Part IV responds to the three key objections to patent misuse—its
vagueness, lax standing requirements and punitive effect on patentees—and
8. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Kimble v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 2013 WL 6665193
(U.S.) (2013) (No. 13-720). See also Brief of the Intellectual Property Law Association of
Chicago as Amicus Curiae on Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Support of Petitioners, Kimble
v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 2014 WL 768706 (U.S.) (2014) (No. 13-720) (arguing that Brulotte is
“out of step” with modern antitrust jurisprudence and should be replaced with a more econom-
ics-based approach.); Brief of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, et al., as Amici Cu-
riae in Support of Petitioners, Kimble v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 2014 WL 768320 (U.S.) at *3
(2014) (No. 13-720) (“By making the payment of royalties that extend beyond the life of the
patent per se illegal, Brulotte prohibits an important financial arrangement that may be pre-
ferred by both patent owner and licensee, and may deter the formation of agreements  through
which commercial actors transform scientific research into pharmaceutical products that bene-
fit society as a whole.”).
9. 6 MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 18:1 (4th ed.) (“Patent misuse refers to a loose
collection of activities by which the patent owner is said to have taken unfair advantage of the
patent right in the marketplace. Where it occurs, patent misuse is an affirmative defense to a
charge of patent infringement. The party raising the defense need not have been the target of
the misuse; instead, he can raise the defense vicariously.”).
10. Act of July 19, 1952,  Pub. L. No. 82-593, §4, 66 Stat. 815. Case reports gleaned
from the Lexis search provided a dataset with over 12,000 data points. See infra Part I.
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explains why the concerns underlying these objections are largely un-
founded. In particular, this Part shows that (1) there are virtues to its open-
ended nature, (2) patent misuse based on antitrust policy is no easier to oper-
ationalize than patent policy, (3) that helping patent misuse find its identity
will be key to greater predictability. It reveals through empirical data that
nearly all parties alleging patent misuse are licensees or competitors, and
that no unrelated party has successfully asserted patent misuse. It explains
that protecting the public interest is a core reason for patent misuse’s broad
standing requirements. Finally, this Part observes that, although patent mis-
use is about deterrence, judges consciously exercise their discretion in tailor-
ing the defense to reach a fair outcome.
In Part IV, the Article recommends that judges and attorneys use the
opportunity provided by Actavis to develop a more thoughtful framework for
patent misuse that draws upon the strengths of its roots in patent policy and
its interface with antitrust policy.
II. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY11
This Section explains the inner workings of the empirical component of
this paper. It begins by looking at why and how the case content analysis
was done. It then explains the relevance of the interviews to the discussion
and provides a list of those interviewed.
A. Case Content Analysis
Case content analysis helps determine whether conventional wisdom on
misuse has empirical support. The data is useful in verifying claims about
case law through data points collected from coding the content of cases.12
Coding provides a means of quantifying otherwise qualitative notions in
misuse for comparison over indicia such as time and space. An initial set of
variables was created based on a review of the literature. A sample number
of cases were coded according to variables. The number of case was ex-
panded and the variables were refined along the way.
The graphs in this Article were created based on a dataset consisting of
all reported U.S. federal opinions that provided substantial analysis of patent
misuse from January 1, 1953, the effective date of the U.S. Patent Act,
through December 31, 2013.13 A Lexis opinion search was conducted in the
11. The methodology mirrors the one adopted for my book, DARYL LIM, PATENT
MISUSE AND ANTITRUST: EMPIRICAL, DOCTRINAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES (2013). The
interview findings presented here were originally conducted for the book. The dataset
presented here have been expanded to include cases reported in 2013.
12. Lee Petherbridge et al., The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical
Assessment, 84 S. CAL L. REV. 1293, 1304 (2011); see also Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright,
Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REV. 63, 77 (2008).
13. Act of July 19, 1952 Pub. L. No. 82-593, §4, 66 Stat. 792, 815, (“This Act shall take
effect on January 1, 1953 and shall apply to all applications for patent filed on or after such
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Lexis Federal Court Cases, Combined database: “patent misuse” or patent w/
3 misuse and date(geq (1/1/1953) and leq (12/31/2013)).
These opinions were then reviewed to exclude those that did not involve
any substantive issue of patent misuse. The result is a dataset spanning 61
years, with 378 cases coded into over 12,000 data points. Each of the opin-
ions was coded directly into an Excel 2013 spreadsheet according to a cod-
ing instrument consisting of 34 variables. The data from the case content
analysis was analyzed using SPSS 21.14 The coding instrument recorded the
following:15
a. REFERENCE DATA: Case citation; date; caption.
b. DOCKET DATA: Level of court deciding case; circuit case was
decided in; court; case posture.
c. FACTS OF THE CASE: Industry case took place in; alleged misuse
or antitrust breach; literature and governmental reports cited,16
whether legislative history featured; whether the case concerned
patent misuse, antitrust or both; the controlling precedent and
the circuit it came from;17 whether the court was willing to ex-
pand the preexisting categories of misuse; the outcome of the
date and to all patents granted on such applications”). “Substantial analysis” refers to patent
cases which both mention and analyze the two issues rather than merely citing them.
14. IBM Corp. Released 2012. IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 21.0.
Armonk, NY: IBM Corp.
15. Not every variable listed here is examined in this Article. The variables are studied
more fully in LIM, supra note 11, at 283-390, 391-429 (These pages reference Chapters 6, The
Empirical Landscape of Misuse, and 7, Charting the Scope of Patent Misuse).
16. See, e.g., Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77, 85 (6th Cir.
1971) (“Motor City is not a party to the allegedly illegal contracts, and a realistic analysis does
not show that the patent in suit ‘itself significantly contributes to the practice under attack.’
See, Report of the Attorney General’s Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 251 (1955).”).
17. In some cases the court cited a precedent that generally stands for one proposition
but used it in the context of another. For example in Cummins, Inc. v. TAS Distrib. Co., the
court cited Windsurfing for the usual proposition that “the patentee has impermissibly broad-
ened the ‘physical or temporal scope’ of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.” Cum-
mins, Inc. v. TAS Distrib. Co., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 701, 705 n.2 (C.D. Ill. 2009) aff’d, 700
F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The case, however, concerned whether the license at issue required
the defendant to pay royalties past the expiration of the patents, and one where Brulotte might
have been expected to be a more natural choice. Such cases were coded as Windsurfing be-
cause the lens through which the court viewed misuse was still consistent with the rest of the
cases in the dataset cited for that proposition. Where a case had more than one type as misuse,
each type of misuse was individually coded while keeping the rest of the variables constant.
For example in Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform of North America, Inc., the defendant
alleged two counts of misuse: tying under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the
Clayton Act, as well as an exclusive agreement under Section 1. Miller Insituform, Inc. v.
Insituform of N. Am., Inc, 605 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). The Court found misuse
with respect to the Section 1 claim but not Section 2 or the claim under the Clayton Act. In this
instance Miller Insituform, Inc would be coded three times, keeping variables other than type
of antitrust and antitrust outcome constant. A column in the dataset codes for repeated cases to
avoid inflating counts of the other variables.
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case in that instance as well as on appeal; instances of applica-
tion for certiorari to the Supreme Court; whether there were dis-
sents. A marker was used to denote cases in which multiple
accounts of misuse were alleged. When this occurred, each
count was analyzed independent of the other counts.
d. SCOPE OF THE PATENT: whether the court defined the “scope of
the patent”; whether the court regarded misuse and antitrust as
coexisting or not; whether coextensive, broader or different and
the policies informing the decision-making;18 the court’s treat-
ment of bad faith by one or both parties.
e. POLICY APPLIED: the study distinguished between patent and
antitrust policy. The distinction between the two can sometimes
be easily missed. Because much of the coding is subject to the
bias of the coder, steps were taken to ensure greater objectivity,
though it is acknowledged that complete objectivity may be im-
possible to attain. Discrepancies were noted and the dataset was
refined along the way. Any discrepancies were case specific
and the final version of the study reports the same overall trends
observed in the initial version.
f. Some cases contained multiple variables, such as the outcome
for each count of misuse. In such cases the same case was coded
twice. An additional column was created in the dataset to mark
cases that are repeats so that they can be filtered off where the
inquiry required that each case only be counted once, such as
the number of cases from each regional circuit court of appeals.
g. Given the small size of the dataset, calculations were rounded
off to the nearest whole number.
Cases are relevant to the quantitative analysis only to the extent that
they reveal a feature of misuse case law that can be categorized and sub-
categorized.19 The dataset does not distinguish between “minor” and “major”
18. See, e.g., Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure, Inc., 2009 WL 815526, at *1 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 26, 2009) (“The doctrine of patent misuse “relates generally to the use of patent
rights to obtain or to coerce an unfair commercial advantage. Patent misuse relates primarily to
a patentee’s actions that affect competition in unpatented goods or that otherwise extend the
economic effect beyond the scope of the patent grant. . . . The patent misuse doctrine is an
extension of the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, whereby a court of equity will not lend
its support to enforcement of a patent that has been misused. Patent misuse arose, as an equita-
ble defense available to the accused infringer, from the desire to restrain practices that did not
in themselves violate any law, but that drew anticompetitive strength from the patent right, and
thus were deemed to be contrary to public policy. When used successfully, this defense results
in rendering the patent unenforceable until the misuse is purged.”) (citations omitted).
19. See LIM, supra note 11, at 443 (“District Court cases proved to be more challenging
than the cases coming from a higher-level court. These cases tended to not be organized as
well having distinct headings and separate sections for each issue of discussion. Many of the
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rulings, because any attempt to do so would almost certainly lead to catego-
rizations that would be indefensible. Instead, cases were included as long as
the court identified, discussed, and made a determination on an allegation of
patent misuse.
Observations about cases within the dataset are confined to what adjudi-
cated decisions reveal. Few disputes reach trial and even those which do
may not result in a published opinion.20 For instance, the dataset excludes
out of court settlements, jury verdicts and pleadings. Also, unless otherwise
indicated, findings are based on a combination of district, appellate and Su-
preme Court decisions. As one might expect, data trends could vary within
each level of the judicial hierarchy according to time, subject matter and
location. More recent records in Lexis and Westlaw are more comprehensive
than earlier ones. These caveats should be borne in mind with the recogni-
tion that the findings may not be generalizable to all misuse disputes regard-
less of whether they resulted in a substantive ruling.21
Much of the coding was objective. However, some of it could not be so.
One of the most challenging aspects of defining the variables was finding a
way to effectively deconstruct the process of how a judge decides a case.22
After reading through a few dozen cases, the rhetoric begins to settle into a
discernable, though inconsistent pattern. Naturally, the cleaving of fluid le-
district court cases addressed on findings of fact more so than legal analysis and precedent
interpretation. Sometimes they cited cases for different propositions. Sometimes they would
list a series of cases and it would not be clear which one they were specifically referring to.
However, this was mitigated by systemically grouping cases together because the proposition
was often cited in groups of cases. In one specific example, the court cited to Microsoft. For
the purposes of the coding key, Senza Gel was used instead of Microsoft because Microsoft is
a district court case cited to only once and the quotes were from Senza Gel.”).
20. Additionally, summary affirmances under FED. R. CIV. P. 36, while omitted, are
also not relevant to the study as they do not add statements of law or explanations to the facts.
However, as others have noted, outcomes under Rule 36 decisions may be relevant because the
appellate court may have applied the relevant doctrine—here misuse—to resolving the issue
on appeal. See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge et al., supra note 12, at 1306 n.41 (noting that Rule 36
dispositions may increase the size of a sample of case outcomes, but that “[t]he text of opin-
ions—the evidence of the law cited in briefs and argued to courts—is unchanged.”); see also
Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1128 (2001) (reporting the use of Rule 36 in 21% of patent cases);
David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1157, 1194 n.176 (2011) (discussing the prevalence of Rule 36 affirmances.).
21. See Petherbridge et al., supra note 12, at 1308 (noting their “endeavor[ ] to collect
the entire population of written inequitable conduct analyses over the period studied”, which
are “by definition a statistically significant representation of the population”).
22. RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 110–11 (2008) (“At every stage the judge’s
reasoning process is primarily intuitive. Given the constraints of time, it could not be other-
wise; for intuition is a great economizer on conscious attention. The role of the unconscious
judge in judicial decision making is obscured by the convention that requires a judge to ex-
plain his decision in an opinion. The judicial opinion can best be understood as an attempt to
explain how the decision, even if (as is most likely) arrived at on the basis of intuition, could
have been arrived at on the basis of logical, step-by-step reasoning.“) (footnote omitted).
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gal analysis into discrete categories for statistical enumeration is liable to
appear artificial, and often it is. The nature of empirical analysis, putting
numbers on people and their behavior, is ultimately an artificial exercise,
and the limits this respect must be readily acknowledged. For example,
judges who write the opinons may present a strategic view of the facts or
law to shape the doctrine. Litigants may also decide to emphasize aspects of
the doctrine on appeal when other aspects may be more applicable.23
At the same time, it is important to underscore that case content analysis
is a well-accepted method of empirical research in law.24 The value of em-
pirical work like this is to articulate judicial decision-making in a way that is
as systematic and comprehesive as possible, thus providing a basis for future
application and refinement.
B. Interviews
The second empirical component links both conventional wisdom and
the unearthed data from the case content analysis to the larger socio-legal
context through interviews. The case content analysis spans 61 years and
378 opinions. The opinions were coded quantitatively. In contrast, the inter-
views were contemporary, narrative and organic. The datasets therefore
complement, rather than provide substitutes for, each other.
The sum of the findings present an empirical analysis of how federal
judges employed the misuse doctrine, and how misuse is currently perceived
by a group of contemporary judges, academics, government officials, and
lawyers. They are not intended to be a representative population of stake-
holders. Instead, they are a group of distinguished individuals who provide a
flavor of well-informed views on the issues discussed in the Article.
Interviews were given on the basis of anonymity. Occasionally inter-
viewees are identified according to their occupations in order to provide
more context to the discussion. Interviewees sometimes prefaced their an-
swers with the caveat that their views straddle the narrow border between
anecdotal observations and reasoned speculation. Below is a list of inter-
viewees with their designations when interviewed.
23. See Petherbridge et al., supra note 12, at 1304.
24. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099 (2000); Barton Beebe, An Empiri-
cal Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008);
Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of
Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 941 (2007); Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk
Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obvi-
ousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051, 2070–71 (2007); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?:
An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV.
223, 237–38 (2008); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?
An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1133–34 (2004).
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III. ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION
Patent misuse is an extension of the equitable doctrine of unclean hands
where courts exercising their discretion will deny enforcement even if in-
fringement is found.25 It acts as a public injunction against abuses of the
privilege granted under patent law, and balances public and private inter-
25. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1957) (“It is now, of
course, familiar law that the courts will not aid a patent owner who has misused his patents to
recover any of their emoluments accruing during the period of misuse or thereafter until the
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ests.26 Examples of patent misuse include tying,27 package licensing,28 and
horizontal price-fixing29 and territorial allocations30 under the guise of sham
patent licenses.31
A judge finding patent misuse has the discretion to withhold damages or
injunctive relief even if the patents themselves have not yet been enforced.32
The patents in question are rendered unenforceable until the effects of the
misuse have been purged.33 Purging requires patentees to show that they
have completely abandoned the misconduct, and that their “baleful effects”
have dissipated.34
effects of such misuse have been dissipated, or ‘purged’ as the conventional saying goes. . . .
The rule is an extension of the equitable doctrine of “unclean hands” to the patent field.”).
26. See Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Floral Innovations, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-00465-SEB-DK,
2012 WL 4477691, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2012) (“A patent is, therefore, appropriately
viewed as a contract between the patentee and the public. Patent misuse occurs when the scope
of an otherwise valid patent monopoly extends beyond the prescribed boundaries of the paten-
tee’s control.”).
27. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (defining tying as
occruing “when a seller conditions its sale of a patented product (the “tying” product) on the
purchase of a second product (the “tied” product)”).
28. For a discussion of package licenses, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST POLICY 241-42 (3d ed. 2005) (“A package license covers more than one patent. A patent
pool occurs when a group of firms license their individually held patents to one another, or
sometimes exchange licenses.”).
29. Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Reasoning Per Se and Horizontal Price Fixing: An Emerg-
ing Trend in Antitrust Litigation?, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 39, 68 n.2 (1986) (“A horizontal price
fixing practice generally involves an agreement among competitors at the same level of the
market structure, such as producers, wholesalers, or retailers, to set, directly or indirectly, a
price for a particular commodity.”).
30. 10 JOHN A. DONOVAN ET AL., BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL
COURT § 111:53 (3d ed. 2013) (describing territorial allocations as arrangements “to divide up
territories so that customers have no choice but to purchase from the seller who has the rights
to the designated territory.”).
31. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) (patentees were not entitled
to use licenses to control pricing of the end products); Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v.
Stokes & Smith Co. 329 U.S. 637 (1947) (grantback clauses to be judged under the rule of
reason); see also, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969)
(demonstrating the coercion of licensees to pay royalties on unpatented and patented products).
For a detailed discussion, see 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 3.3.
32. See, e.g., United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 458 (1922).
33. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
34. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 124 F. Supp. 573, 594–95 (D.D.C 1955) (“This
rule is applicable where the owner of patent rights seeks to extend those rights beyond the
limits of his patent monopoly.”). What amounts to a successful dissipation depends on the
nature and extent of the misuse. Cancellation of an offending licensing clause may be suffi-
cient. Where the conduct involves a price-fixing conspiracy, the violation is presumed to con-
tinue until some affirmative act of termination or withdrawal is shown. See United States v.
Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 573 (2d Cir. 1961). Where the misuse consists of
“extensive and aggravated misconduct over several years,” which “substantially rigidified the
price structure of an entire market and suppressed competition over a wide area, affirmative
action may be essential to effectively dispel the consequences of the unlawful conduct.” See
Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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Abandonment of the misconduct may occur at any time, even after the
filing of the suit in which the question of misuse is raised. The standard is an
objective one, and the abandonment need not take the particular form de-
sired by the defendant.35 At the same time, “[t]here is no set time period for
purging; the time will vary with the facts of each case,” since “whether a
purge has been accomplished is a factual matter and is ‘largely discretionary
with the trial court.’”36 Additionally, successful defendants may recover ex-
penses in defending the action in an award for damages.37
Patent misuse and the antitrust laws both seek to restrain the myriad of
ways that a patentee’s exclusive right can be abused.38 Indeed, at a suffi-
ciently high level of abstraction, the goals of promoting innovation and com-
petition pursued by both the antitrust and patent laws are similar39
Authorized under the Commerce Clause,40 the antitrust laws promote vigor-
ous competition in the marketplace so that consumers benefit from a variety
of goods and services at competitive prices.41 The Supreme Court heralded
the antitrust laws as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise,”42 and explained
that they “are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our
free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our funda-
mental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed to each and every
business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete.”43
Early courts observed an “obvious tension” between the patent law and
the antitrust laws, because one “creates and protects monopoly power while
the other seeks to proscribe it.”44 Later courts were more conciliatory, recog-
nizing that patent and antitrust laws serve the public in complementary but
different ways. Specifically, the patent system facilitates invention by ensur-
ing a return on risky investments, while the antitrust laws foster market com-
petition.45 Despite the latter view prevailing today, the intersection between
the patent and antitrust laws remains “a source of confusion and contro-
35. See B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942).
36. Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 375 F. Supp. 1, 71 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
37. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron Inc., 562 F.2d 365, 374 (6th Cir.
1977).
38. See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013) (“[P]atent and antitrust
policies are both relevant in determining the “scope of the patent monopoly”); Dawson Chem.
Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221 (1980) (“The policy of free competition runs deep
in our law. It underlies both the doctrine of patent misuse and the general principle that the
boundary of a patent monopoly is to be limited by the literal scope of the patent claims.”).
39. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 1 (2007).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3 (giving Congress the power to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce).
41. See generally 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 1.2.
42. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
43. Id.
44. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1981).
45. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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versy.”46 Patent misuse rests at the heart of the patent-antitrust interface and
has inherited all of that “confusion and controversy.”47 In 1957, the Ninth
Circuit observed that patent misuse was “one of the most important and un-
settled aspects of patent law.”48 That sentiment continues to echo on today.49
According to a 2013 patent litigation study conducted by Price-
waterhouseCoopers (the PwC Study), patent litigation in America is rising,
nearly tripling in the last ten years (see Figure 1 below). Part of the reason
stems a higher number of patent filings and grants. Figure 1 shows the
strong correlation between the spike in litigation and patent grants.50 As the
number of issued patents increase, companies anxious to avoid these “patent
thickets”51 will contribute to a higher frequency of licensing agreements and
therefore increase the likelihood that misuse might result.52
46. See LIM, supra note 11, at 31. (“Some courts have viewed misuse as a broader
wrong than antitrust violations, so that while the nature of the offense may be similar, misuse
may arise if the degree of the offense does not warrant attention under the antitrust laws.”).
47. See, e.g., 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 3.1 (“The doctrines of intellectual
property misuse lay an important foundation for the main subject of this book. Misuse is
closely intertwined with antitrust law, and most findings of misuse are conditioned on conduct
that would also violate the antitrust laws.”)
48. Stearns v. Tinker & Rasor, 252 F.2d 589, 600 (9th Cir. 1957).
49. Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and
Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905, 929 (2010) (commenting that the “uncertainty” created by the
ambiguous boundaries of a patent makes it “impossible to say that no reasonable person would
have brought a particular infringement suit to enforce a patent.”).
50. The spike in 2011 and 2012 is likely driven by joinder rule changes. See Jay Kesan,
Christopher Cotropia and David L. Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (Chicago-
Kent College of Law Research Paper No. 2013-49, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346381.
51. See Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The
Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 166-67 (2011) (“A ‘patent thicket’
exists when too many patents covering individual elements of a commercial  product are sepa-
rately owned by different entities.”).
52. Marshall Leaffer, Patent Misuse and Innovation, 10 J. HIGH TECH. L. 142, 142
(2010) (“As the number of issued patents skyrocket, companies more frequently enter into
arrangements with competitors ‘not only to recover their investment from creating patented
products but also to avoid the patent landmines that line the path of innovation.’”).
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FIGURE 1. PATENT CASE FILINGS AND GRANTS53
Another factor fuelling the high rate of litigation may be the high payoff
to the plaintiff from a successful suit. The PwC study reveals that “the an-
nual median damage award ranged from $1.9 to $16.5 million between 1995
and 2012, with an overall median award of $5.5 million over the last 18
years.”54 Increased litigation risks should lead to more defendants invoking
patent misuse to shield themselves from liability.55
53. Chris Barry et al., 2013 Patent Litigation Study: Big Cases Make Headlines, While
Patent Cases Proliferate, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP 6, 34  (Jun. 2013), http://www.
pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf (“To
study the trends related to patent decisions, PwC identified final decisions at summary
judgment and trial recorded in two WestLaw databases, U.S. District Court Cases (DCT) and
Combined Jury Verdicts and Settlements (JV-ALL), as well as in corresponding Public Access
to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system records. The study focuses on 1,856 district
court patent decisions issued since 1995.”).
54. Id. at 7.
55. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 111 (2007),
available at www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt
0704.pdf (quoting May 14, 2002 Hr’g Tr., Antitrust Analysis of Specific Intellectual Property
Licensing Practices: Bundling, Grantbacks and Temporal Extensions (Morning Session)).
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FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF MISUSE CASES 1953 – 2013 (TOTAL)
Swept by a rising tide of litigation, the number of patent misuse cases on
the whole has also risen over the years, but with a smaller proportion of
cases in recent years compared to the 1950s and 1960s (see Figure 2 above).
As a proxy of activity, it is useful to compare them with inequitable conduct
cases. Like patent misuse, inequitable conduct is a defense to patent in-
fringement.56 Both inequitable conduct and patent misuse are equitable rem-
edies, and therefore very much subject to the discretion of the court.
Inequitable conduct results in unenforceability ab initio and is unsalvage-
able. Misuse results in temporary unenforceability. They exist on different
points within the same spectrum.
Courts have treated inequitable conduct as overlapping with patent mis-
use.57 Between 1983 and 2008, inequitable conduct featured in about 300
56. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“To prevail on the defense of inequitable conduct, the accused infringer must prove that the
applicant misrepresented or omitted material information with the specific intent to deceive the
PTO.“).
57. See, e.g., Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., No. 08-
309-JJF-LPS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118383, at *29 n.6 (D. Del. Dec. 18, 2009) (“Power
relies for its patent misuse defense on the same ‘facts and allegations’ on which it bases its
inequitable conduct allegations.”); see also Tessenderlo Kerley, Inc. v. Or-Cal, Inc., No. C 11-
04100 WHA, 2012 WL 1094324, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012) (“Defendant’s patent misuse
defense appears to rest entirely on its inequitable conduct allegations.”).
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cases at the Federal Circuit.58 In contrast, the Federal Circuit has decided
twenty-one patent misuse cases during the same period.59  Because the facts
that give rise to inequitable conduct potentially give rise to misuse, it is
surprising that patent misuse is not alleged every time an allegation of ineq-
uitable conduct is raised. The incongruity of the sparing use and an increas-
ing need of defendants for a defense like patent misuse makes for a curious
conundrum. And to understand this conundrum, one must trace the evolution
of patent misuse to its origins.
A. A Supreme Court Original
The history of patent misuse spans nearly a century. The Supreme Court
first articulated the defense in 1917 in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Univer-
sal Film Mfg. Co.60 The Court held that a patentee could not use its patent on
projector technology to control the sale of movie film. This tie was outside
the scope of the patent.61 A leading treatise noted the case “established the
misuse doctrine as rooted in patent policy,” and “set the stage for the doc-
trine’s preoccupation with ‘extension’ of the patent monopoly in general.”62
58. Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the “Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine of Ineq-
uitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1333 (2009).
59. See Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex Inc., 659 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Princo Corp. v.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 563
F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,
459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); U.S. Philips Corp. v. Princo Corp., 173 F. App’x 832 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Mon-
santo Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d
1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Nashua Corp., 185 F.3d 884 (Fed. Cir. 1999); C.R.
Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel
Co., 133 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1997); B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Glaverbel
Societe Anonyme v. Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc., 45 F.3d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Mallinc-
krodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning
Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., 833 F.2d 1575 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Windsurfing Int’l Inc.
v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
60. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
61. Id. at 517 (“[W]e are convinced that the exclusive right granted in every patent must
be limited to the invention described in the claims of the patent, and that it is not competent for
the owner of a patent by notice attached to its machine to, in effect, extend the scope of its
patent monopoly by restricting the use of it to materials necessary in its operation but which
are no part of the patented invention, or to send its machines forth into the channels of trade of
the country subject to conditions as to use or royalty to be paid, to be imposed thereafter at the
discretion of such patent owner.”).
62. 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 3.2a; see also Motion Pictures, 243 U.S. at
519 (“A restriction which would give to the plaintiff such a potential power for evil over an
industry . . . is plainly void, because wholly without the scope and purpose of our patent laws
and because, if sustained, it would be gravely injurious to that public interest, which we have
seen is more a favorite of the law than is the promotion of private fortunes.”).
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However, it was not until 1942 that the Supreme Court formally articulated
the doctrine in Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppiger Co.63
Morton Salt’s patented machine deposited salt tablet in canned goods. It
leased its machines to customers if they purchased their salt tablets from
Morton Salt.64 Morton Salt discovered the defendant making infringing ma-
chines and sued it for patent infringement.65 Writing for a unanimous Court,
Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone framed the question as “whether a court of
equity will lend its aid to protect the patent monopoly when respondent is
using it as the effective means of restraining competition with its sale of an
unpatented article.”66
Morton Salt illustrates the influence of competition policy on patent
misuse, even though the Court consciously avoided relying on antitrust law
in formulating the defense.67 Patent law is concerned about competition, but
an IP doctrine does not become encrusted by antitrust analysis merely be-
cause it bears a shade of competition policy. As Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor noted, “the Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the
need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle
competition without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science
and useful Arts.’”68 It is unsurprising then that allegations of misuse, such as
the tying found in Morton Salt, involve some competition concerns.
But patent misuse is not the only patent doctrine concerned with compe-
tition. Courts use patent exhaustion to prevent patentees from leveraging
their patents to control downstream commerce.69 Similarly, judge-made doc-
trines such as experimental use and inequitable conduct respectively circum-
scribe the extent to which patentees can interfere with third party activities
and extinguish conferred rights because patentees had in fact contributed
nothing worthy of a patent award.70 More broadly, doctrines such as the fair
63. 314 U.S. 488 (1942); see also Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 975
(4th Cir. 1990) (“Although a patent misuse defense was recognized by the courts as early as
1917, most commentators point to Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger . . . as the foundational
patent misuse case”); Robert J. Hoerner, The Decline (and Fall?) of the Patent Misuse Doc-
trine in Federal Circuit, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 670 (2002). (“The ‘misuse of the patent’
doctrine was originated by name in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.”).
64. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 491.
65. Id. at 490.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 494 (finding it “unnecessary to decide whether [the patentee] had violated the
Clayton act, for [it] concluded that in any event the maintenance of the present suit . . .  [was]
against public policy”). The Clayton Act is an antitrust statute. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012).
68. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
69. See, e.g., Daryl Lim, Self-Replicating Technologies and the Challenge for the Patent
and Antitrust Laws, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 131 (2013) (discussing exhaustion in the
context of self-replicating technologies such as genetically modified seeds).
70. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POL-
ICY: CASES AND MATERIAL 842-54, 1056-80 (6th ed. 2013) (discussing experimental use and
inequitable conduct).
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use defense in copyright and functionality in trademark law illustrate how IP
policy endogenously incorporate competition concerns.71
A second reason for the overlap relates to how they feature in litigation.
Patent misuse and antitrust issues are routinely tried together, separate from
patent validity and infringement.72 Third, misuse cases tend to arise out of
patent licensing agreements. Such agreements affect market competition,
and courts have expanded misuse to include antitrust standards to address
market distortions.73 The overlap has led some courts to view misuse as a
similar albeit broader wrong than antitrust, so that an offense that does not
warrant attention under the antitrust laws due to market power may still give
rise to misuse.74
Notwithstanding the competition policy overlap, it is important to recog-
nize that patent misuse and the antitrust laws differ in a number of respects.
First, misuse is an affirmative defense; antitrust laws state a federal cause of
action. As a defense, misuse is also cheaper to raise as a counterclaim than
to initiate an antitrust suit.75 Defendants in patent infringement suits are nor-
mally reactive parties in the litigation process. However, with declaratory
judgments, defendants can proactively neutralize a patentee’s advance.76 The
Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., serves to
71. See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 05 CIV. 8136 (DC), 2013 WL
6017130 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2013) (discussing fair use in copyright law); In re Morton-Nor-
wich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (discussing functionality in trademark law).
For a comparative perspective, see Ashish Lall & Daryl Lim, Singapore, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS IN ASIA (R Ian McEwin ed., 2011).
72. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Comfortex Corp., 44 F. Supp. 2d 145 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)
(holding that antitrust and patent misuse would be heard separately from the infringement
claims).
73. Thomas F. Maffei, The Patent Misuse Doctrine: A Balance of Patent Rights and the
Public Interest, 11 B.C. L. REV. 46, 52 (1969) (“Because the subject matter of the licensing
agreement and the manner in which it is obtained effect directly the maintenance of a competi-
tive economy, the existence of licensing abuses has necessitated the application of antitrust
principles to patent law.”).
74. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140–41 (1969)
(“[I]f there was such patent misuse, it does not necessarily follow that the misuse embodies the
ingredients of a violation of either § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman Act, or that Zenith was threatened
by a violation so as to entitle it to an injunction under § 16 of the Clayton Act”). But see
Raychem Corp. v. PSI Telecomms., No. C-93-20920 RPA, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22325, at
*9 (N.D. Cal. March 6, 1995) (“Although the contours of this doctrine are vague, patent mis-
use claims are generally tested by conventional antitrust principles.”).
75. See LIM, supra note 11, at 412 (noting avoidance of higher litigation costs incurred
from “economic analysis required to define markets and show that the elements of antitrust
injury are met.”).
76. 1 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION,
TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 4:57 (4th ed. 2010); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski
Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014) (holding that the patent holder bears the burden
of proving infringement, even in a declaratory judgment action brought by a licensee.).
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encourage challenges to patent validity,77 leading commentators to suggest
that this might include challenges by licensees on the basis of misuse by
licensors as well.78
While this may appear to narrow the gap between misuse and antitrust
as a matter of litigation strategy, other differences exist. Unlike antitrust
plaintiffs who need to show evidence of an antitrust injury, infringers assert-
ing misuse need not prove direct harm from the misuse.79 Further, whereas
misuse results in unenforceability of the patent, antitrust provides for a host
of remedies, including a devastating nondiscretionary trebling of damages
by a court.80
The most critical difference, however, is that antitrust policy does not
address the questions which patent policy cares about. Herbert Hovenkamp
and Christina Bohannan observed that “[t]he antitrust approach undervalues
the fact that the roots of misuse doctrine lie in IP policy, not in antitrust
policy, and IP policy has its own reasons for limiting overreaching.”81 Ac-
cording to them, “[e]ven on antitrust’s own rationale for misuse, namely to
prevent anticompetitive conduct, the antitrust definition has focused too
much attention on market power in the patented or copyrighted product or
technology, and too little on the foreclosure of rival products or technolo-
gies.”82 Indeed, this difference was one of the few things that the majority
and dissent in Actavis agreed on.83
77. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007) (enhancing the
ability of licensees to challenge the scope and validity of patents  by allowing licensees to
challenge licensed patents while retaining the protection of the license.).
78. See Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 2008
EMERGING ISSUES 872 (2007) (noting that, prior to MedImmune, patent owners would assume
that a “no contest” clause would be unenforceable or could constitute patent misuse, but that
now those assumptions should be revisited); see also Stephanie Chu, Operation Restoration:
How Can Patent Holders Protect Themselves from MedImmune?, 2007 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 8, at *6 (2007) (“MedImmune leaves patent owners wondering whether or not they can
contract around their potential vulnerability to patent challenges.”).
79. See, e.g., JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775 (7th Cir.
1999).
80. Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1922, 1924
(1997).
81. CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 260 (2012).
82. Id.
83. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2225 (2013) (“It would be incongruous to
determine antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely against
patent law policy, and not against procompetitive antitrust policies as well. Both are relevant in
determining the scope of monopoly and antitrust immunity conferred by a patent. . . .”); id. at
2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The point of antitrust law is to encourage competitive mar-
kets to promote consumer welfare. The point of patent law is to grant limited monopolies as a
way of encouraging innovation.”). But see Robin Feldman, Ending Patent Exceptionalism &
Structuring the Rule of Reason: The Supreme Court Opens the Door for Both, 15 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2333291 (“Despite common misperceptions, the patent system is not a monstrous
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Patent law assumes that market failure resulting from free-riding would
result in a suboptimal level of innovation to the detriment of society, and
incentivizes innovation.84 To fulfill the Constitutional mandate for Congress
to “promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,”85 Congress allows
patentees to exclude others, earn royalties, and set the terms of access for
those benefitting from the use of patented technologies.86 This limited mo-
nopoly rewards innovators who take risks and invest in innovation and the
commercialization of their inventions, incentivizing them to disclose, de-
velop and market inventions that may not have been realized otherwise.87
The lure of exclusive rights also attracts others into the inventive enter-
prise. It feeds into a virtuous cycle of innovation where each successive
generation “stand[s] upon the shoulders of Giants”88 as new entrants, licen-
sees, and competitors are enabled to build upon the patentee’s technology,
which is disclosed in return for the monopoly protection.89 When patentees
are overcompensated for their contributions, it disrupts the incentive system
and results in inefficiency and reduced technological output. According to
Thomas Jefferson, overreaching patent owners becomes “more embarrass-
ment than advantage to society.”90 In policing patent misconduct, judges ap-
plying patent misuse attempt to delineate this metaphysical boundary.
The Supreme Court forged patent misuse as a tool to prevent abuses of
the patent system, regardless of a demonstrable effect on competition.91 It
begins with the premise that the patent grant is not a property right as such,
beast, rapacious for the sacrifice of competition. Even the majority opinion in Actavis subtly
falls prey to the simplistic image of patents, imaging that the patent system is single-mindedly
anticompetitive. . . . Along the same lines, the dissenting opinion is strongly out of focus when
it notes that ‘the whole point of a patent [is] to confer a limited monopoly.’”).
84. See, e.g., Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 49, at 922 (“[M]arket failure is the
starting point for IP laws, and it is market failure that gives rise to the need for legal
entitlements.”).
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
86. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283–285 (2012) (providing for patent infringement remedies such as
injunctions, damages, and attorney fees).
87. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (“The patent laws
promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development.”).
88. Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (1676) (on file with author).
89. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (requiring the patent applicant be fully in possession of the
invention claimed and to disclose his invention in a manner which enables a person ordinarily
skilled in the art to make and use the invention).
90. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html.
91. 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 3.2 (“[S]ince the inception of the misuse
doctrine, courts have treated extension of a patent grant—by lengthening its duration, by bun-
dling it with some other unpatented product, or by some other means—as an evil to be avoided
regardless of a demonstrable effect on competition. While concerns about competition clearly
animated the Court’s first statement of misuse doctrine in the Motion Picture Patents case, the
Court has also been concerned about what might be termed the integrity of the patent system.
Patent policy permits the grant of exclusive rights only under certain conditions and only
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but a privilege conferred by the patent office to promote technological pro-
gress.92 Patentees found to be misusing their patents are not allowed to en-
force their patents.93
Patent misuse may be analogized to the fair use defense in copyright
law. Fair use permits use of copyrighted works “to fulfill copyright’s very
purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”94 Like pat-
ent misuse, fair use is “an open-ended and context-sensitive inquiry”.95 Bath
fair use and patent misuse are rooted in IP policy despite its inquiry into
aspects of market competition.96 As noted earlier, misuse contains a blend of
competition and innovation policies. In the case of fair use, the crucial in-
quiry is “whether the new work merely supersedes the original work, or
instead adds something new with a further purpose or of a different
character.”97
Ramsey Hanna observed that, in contrast to “copyright and patent law
[which] recognize the importance of encouraging socially beneficial innova-
tion,” antitrust law “lacks similar sensitivity to the central role of innova-
within a limited scope, and the expansion of that scope through coercive use of a government-
granted legal right has been thought to undermine the limitations built into patent law.”).
92. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The copy-
right law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.”); see
also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (noting that unlike real
property rights, “the Patent Act itself indicates that patents shall have the attributes of personal
property ‘[s]ubject to the provisions of this title.’”).
93. BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 264 (“Thus developed the highly dra-
conian remedy that if a patentee’s license agreement constitutes ‘misuse,’ the patentee loses its
right to enforce that patent against anyone.”).
94. Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576-77 (1994) (“[T]he fair use
of a copyrighted work, . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include—(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.”); see also id. at 594 (finding that the commercial char-
acter of a song parody did not create presumption against fair use).
95. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012) (examining “the effect of the use upon the potential mar-
ket for or value of the copyrighted work.”).
97. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will
be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of
fair use.”). A similar rationale exists for trademark fair use. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block
v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1992) (“While the New Kids have a
limited property right in their name, that right does not entitle them to control their fans’ use of
their own money. Where, as here, the use does not imply sponsorship or endorsement, the fact
that it is carried on for profit and in competition with the trademark holder’s business is beside
the point.”).
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tion.”98 Hanna partly attributes this to “a dearth of economic literature
dealing with determinants, mechanics, and dynamic effects of innovation”99
as well as “the difficulty in defining markets in industries with differentiated
but highly substitutable goods.”100
Antitrust law is concerned about economic monopoly power and of pat-
entees using that power to raise prices and stifle output.101 It works ex post to
create a competitive environment taking into account the need to incentivize
innovation. Although the antitrust laws purport to take into account dynamic
efficiencies that include innovation concerns, commentators like Marshall
Leaffer are concerned that it does not do so “adequately”102 because antitrust
policy has a “natural bias” toward static analysis, which is more
measurable.103
The differences between antitrust and patent policy led Robin Feldman
to conclude that antitrust law is “designed to address only particular types of
harm, and it cannot reach everything that patent policy addresses.”104 As
98. Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional Copyright
Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401, 422 (1994) (footnote omitted).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 431.
101. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1781 (3d ed.
2008).
102. Leaffer, supra note 52, at 153; see also Ilan Charnelle, The Justification and Scope
of the Copyright Misuse Doctrine and Its Independence of the Antitrust Laws, 9 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. 167, 197 (2002) (“Antitrust analysis relies on static single-period models that do not
account for innovation and its effect on consumer welfare. In static single-period models, an
investment is assumed to last for a set time period and the focus is on two possible fixed values
at the end of that time period. The investment can go up or down, usually on a percentage
basis. These models do not take into account fluctuations in value that occur between the start
of the investment and the end of the investment. In order for innovation and creativity to occur,
these fluctuations must be examined.”).
103. See Joshua S. Gans, When is Static Analysis a Sufficient Proxy for Dynamic Con-
siderations? Reconsidering Antitrust and Innovation 2 (April 29, 2010) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1603955 (describing
static analysis as “largely based on price,” compared to dynamic analysis where “innovation
plays a significant role”); Transcript, The Antitrust Marathon Part II: The Role of a Consumer
Harm Test in Competition Policy, 20 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 151, 163 (2008) (remarks of
Christopher Leslie: “[T]he problem [is that] . . . static price analysis appears to be so precise. It
gives this illusion of a precise quantifiable answer that you can see on a graph. But there’s just
no way that you can easily put quality, innovation, and consumer choice on that graph. Even
when you try to have a balance between these two things, our natural bias is to give more
weight to the thing that looks measurable.”); see also J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, The Role of Static and Dynamic Analysis in Pharmaceutical Antitrust at the Fifth
Annual In-House Counsel Forum on Pharmaceutical Antitrust 4–5 (Feb. 18, 2010), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100218pharmaantitrust.pdf (“The antitrust community—
both lawyers and economists—has far greater familiarity and comfort with static analysis than
dynamic analysis.”).
104. See Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 399, 400 (2003); see also Leaffer, supra note 52, at 157 (“Patent policy is
involved with expansions of patent rights that impede system-wide innovation; even if those
expansions do not create the kind of consequences that the antitrust law takes into account.
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examples of these unreachable aspects, she cites the following: preventing
economic loss that occurs in defensive research activities in patent circum-
vention; the negative effects on innovation caused by an excess of patent
rights, and the impediments to innovation from awarding patents to early-
stage inventors at the expense of late-stage inventors.105
Julie Cohen, Brett Frischmann, Dan Moylan and a number of others
agree, and they have argued that misuse provides a more relevant answer to
harms to market innovation.106 These may include the lack of ability to use
and the diminished position of licensees that results from the ability to meter
uses.107 These fundamental differences in policy explain why different or
additional elements may be required to prove an antitrust violation from a
case of patent misuse.
From the 1940s until the 1970s, the Supreme Court continued to shape
patent misuse in cases involving restrictive license agreements, vexatious
litigation and other patent abuses.108 However, things came to a head in Mer-
coid Corp. v. Mid-Continent, Inv. Co., when the Court extended misuse to
render tying arrangements unenforceable even though the tied components
had no substantial non-infringing uses.109 Mercoid provoked a Congressional
response, immunizing tying arrangements covering non-staple items in the
context of contributory infringement.110 In 1988, Congress tacked on addi-
tional restrictions immunizing from misuse refusals to license as well as ty-
The basic problem is that antitrust focuses on competition in defined markets and in so doing
tends to disregard, and may even be blind to, activities that undermine the overall effectiveness
of the patent system.”) (footnote omitted).
105. Feldman, supra note 123, at 400; see also Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irration-
ality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1599, 1611 (1990) (“[A]ctivities consti-
tuting patent misuse can (and often do) diverge from those activities constituting antitrust
violations.”).
106. See Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism:
Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091,
1192–94 (1995) (arguing that the misuse doctrine may be better tailored than antitrust to ad-
dress harm to innovation); Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doc-
trine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 865, 927–30 (2000) (arguing that misuse doctrine should come into play in some
cases in which restraints undermine public policy, such as by unduly inhibiting innovation,
even if they fall short of violating antitrust law); see also Note, supra note 80, at 1934–36
(arguing potential harm to innovation markets may justify the application of patent misuse in
some cases, but noting the difficulty of applying this insight in practice).
107. I am grateful to Josh Sarnoff for this observation.
108. See LIM, supra note 11, at 287.
109. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
110. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(1)–(3) (2012); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448
U.S. 176, 200 (1980) (“The Mercoid decisions left in their wake some consternation among
patent lawyersand a degree of confusion in the lower courts. . . . Certain segments of the patent
bar eventually decided to ask Congress for corrective legislation that would restore some scope
to the contributory infringement doctrine. With great perseverance, they advanced their propo-
sal in three successive Congresses before it eventually was enacted in 1952 as 35 U.S.C.
§ 271.”).
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ing arrangements where the patent owner lacked market power.111 But
whereas Congress took a piecemeal approach to misuse reform, the Federal
Circuit would seek to change it entirely.
B. Patent Misuse under the Federal Circuit: Windsurfing and its Progeny
Established in 1982, the Federal Circuit is unique among appellate
courts in that its jurisdiction is determined by subject matter rather than geo-
graphical location.112 While the Federal Circuit’s portfolio covers a number
of areas including federal claims, veterans’ claims, international trade dis-
pute claims, and federal employment claims, it is perhaps best known for its
role as the nation’s appellate patent court. It was a new kind of court, an
experimental court created especially for the adjudication of patent rights,
and the first of its kind anywhere in the world.113 And, because patent misuse
is a defense to patent infringement, “what constitutes substantive misuse is
ordinarily a matter within the control of the Federal Circuit.”114
Commentators observed that the Federal Circuit “rapidly strengthed the
rights of patent owners.”115 The Federal Circuit does not have exclusive ju-
risdiction over patent-antitrust cases.116 However, it has asserted its jurisdic-
tion over those cases.117 Consistent with its mission, incorporating antitrust
principles within patent trials would give the Federal Circuit greater influ-
ence in controlling how antitrust principles would be applied to patents.118
111. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5).
112. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–164, 96 Stat. 25,
§§ 37–39 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000)).
113. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437,
1453, 1461, 1467 (2012).
114. MARTIN ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 814 (3d ed.
2009); see also Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 912 (2007) (“The Federal
Circuit therefore has taken the leading role in recent years in refining the contours of the
patent misuse doctrine.”).
115. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 1.3a.
116. CHRISTOPHER LESLIE, ANTITRUST LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS (2010) 577 (“In adjudicating non-patent issues in patent cases, the
Federal Circuit is supposed to apply the law of the regional circuit where the district court
whose decision the Federal Circuit was reviewing.”).
117. See e.g., Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (“[W]hether conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a paten-
tee of its immunity from the antitrust laws is to be decided as a question of Federal Circuit
law.”); see also Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (“Pro-Mold and Nobelpharma make clear that our responsibility as the tribunal having
sole appellate responsibility for the development of patent law requires that we do more than
simply apply our law to questions of substantive patent law. In order to fulfill our obligation of
promoting uniformity in the field of patent law, it is equally important to apply our construc-
tion of patent law to the questions whether and to what extent patent law preempts or conflicts
with other causes of action.”).
118. See, e.g., THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY 67 (2002) (noting the different outcomes reached by the Federal Circuit [in In
re Indep. Serv. Organizations Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000)] and Ninth
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Federal Circuit first had occasion to consider patent misuse in Wind-
sur?ng Int’l v. AMF, Inc.119 The patent licensor required licensees to ac-
knowledge the validity of its trademarks.120 The package deal prevented
challenges to the validity of the marks.121 In declining to find misuse, the
Federal Circuit held that the alleged infringer had to show the patentee im-
permissibly broadened the physical or temporal scope of the patent grant
with anticompetitive effect “in an appropriately defined relevant market.”122
Although antitrust law has a well-developed framework for market defi-
nition, a similar framework was foreign to patent law analysis.123 The infu-
sion of patent misuse with antitrust law became even more apparent in the
Federal Circuit’s 1992 decision in of Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.,124
where “as with an affirmative antitrust claim, the issue of misuse was held to
require further legal analysis under relevant antitrust principles before it
could be determined whether invalidating misuse had occurred.”125
Later Federal Circuit cases identified three categories of patent misuse
and articulated a framework for analyzing misuse cases. The first are forms
of per se misuse, which include tying, post-expiration royalties and price-
fixing arrangements.126 In the second category are forms of conduct specifi-
cally immunized from a finding of misuse.127 These include refusals to li-
cense, as well as tying arrangements in which the patent owner had no
proven market power.128
Circuit [in Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216 (9th Cir.
1997)] on “strikingly similar facts.”).
119. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
120. Id. at 1001.
121. 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 3.3.
122. Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at 1001–02.
123. Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Mar-
ket Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2077 (2012). (“Antitrust law has a well-
developed methodology for defining markets, but, as we argued, that methodology does not
work well in the context of IP goods. . . . To the extent we want to reduce IP owners’ market
power, there are doctrinal levers within IP that can be used to enable more and better substi-
tutes.”). But see id. at 2069–70 (“Market definition plays a role in several patent contexts too
because courts are sometimes called on to determine the extent to which there are alternatives
to the patented invention or the range of relevant prior art.”)
124. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
125. 1 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 1:17
(2013). (“Typical is the 1992 Federal Circuit decision of Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.,
where it was held that a patentee did not commit per se patent misuse by prohibiting purchas-
ers of its patented products from reconditioning and reusing the products. Rather, as with an
affirmative antitrust claim, the issue of misuse was held to require further legal analysis under
relevant antitrust principles before it could be determined whether invalidating misuse had
occurred.”) (footnote omitted).
126. See Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see
also Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 704.
127. Va. Panel, 133 F.3d at 869; see supra text accompanying note 111.
128. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5) (2012).
324 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 20:299
If the conduct is neither expressly exempted nor condemned, it falls into
the third category. Courts first determine if that practice relates to subject
matter “within the scope of the patent claims.”129 If so, “the practice does not
have the effect of broadening the scope of the patent claims and thus cannot
constitute patent misuse.”130 If the conduct is not within the scope of the
patent claims, the anticompetitive effects flowing from the extension must
be analyzed under a rule of reason, where the reasonableness of the restraint
on competition is determined by taking into account “information about the
relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed,
and the restraint’s history, nature and effect.”131 In Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling, the court elaborated that, where “the restriction is reasonably
within the patent grant, the patent misuse defense can never succeed.”132
In an en banc review, Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n further lim-
ited the applicability of patent misuse.133 Affirming the panel below, the ma-
jority held that even an antitrust violation would not give rise to a misuse
defense if the alleged misuse was not directly asserted against the defen-
dant.134 In that case, the patentee agreed with its rival to refrain from offering
competing alternatives to technology for recordable and rewritable compact
discs in return for a share of the patentee’s profits.135 One of the patentee’s
licensees stopped its payments and alleged misuse on the grounds that the
parties were conspiring to suppress the rival’s technology.136 The Princo dis-
sent found misuse on the basis that the licensing agreements between the
patentee and its licensees was part and parcel of the horizontal agreement
between the patentee and its rival to suppress the rivals’ technology.137
The discussion of the history of misuse reveals two different premises
for invoking the defense: the Morton Salt standard, which focuses upon
abuses of the patent system, and the Windsurfing standard, which focuses
upon anticompetitive effects measured through the rubric of the antitrust
129. Va. Panel, 133 F.3d at 869.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
133. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
134. Id. at 1331 (“Patent misuse will not be found when there is ‘no connection’ between
the patent right and the misconduct in question, or no ‘use’ of the patent.”) (citation omitted).
For a detailed critique of the Princo decision, see Daryl Lim, Misconduct in Standard Setting:
The Case for Patent Misuse, 51 IDEA 559 (2011).
135. Princo, 616 F.3d at 1323.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1342 (Dyk J., dissenting) (“I read the relevant Supreme Court cases and con-
gressional legislation as supporting a vigorous misuse defense, clearly applicable to agree-
ments to suppress alternative technology. The majority cabins the doctrine in contravention of
this Supreme Court authority.”).
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laws. Antitrust law has made clear for at least forty years that it is interested
in protecting market competition and not the competitor.138
Thus, unless the patent defendant can show market harm, there is no
misuse under the Federal Circuit’s formulation. As the Seventh Circuit noted
“[i]f no consumer interest can be discerned even remotely in a suit brought
by a competitor—if, as here, a victory for the competitor can confer no ben-
efit, certain or probable, present or future, on consumers—a court is entitled
to question whether a violation of antitrust law is being charged.”139
Diminished antitrust scrutiny and a weaker misuse defense favor paten-
tees. Defendants face formidable hurdles proving market power and an-
ticompetitive effects, since they would have to marshal economic evidence,
market surveys and engage in a “turducken” antitrust trial within an already
complicated patent infringement suit.140
To better understand the Federal Circuit’s impact on patent misuse, it is
helpful to look at the number of cases that have cited its jurisprudence over
the years (see Figure 3 below).141
138. See Brooke Grp. Ltd v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224
(1993).
139. Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 266–67 (7th Cir. 1984).
140. “Turducken” refers to a dish where a turkey is stuffed with a duck that is in turn
stuffed with a chicken. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 3.2. (“[D]emonstrating
misuse will require a full-fledged economic inquiry into the definition of the market, barriers
to entry, and the like.”).
141. See Part I for a discussion on how precedent cases were selected and coded.
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FIGURE 3. DISTRIBUTION BY PRECEDENT OVER TIME (1953 – 2013)
It is clear that Windsurfing has almost exclusively dominated the cases
across all levels since 1993.142 This change happened remarkably quickly.
Morton Salt was on the wane between 1953 and 1982, falling from 41 per-
cent of cases to 27 percent. By the time the Federal Circuit began to take
cases, Morton Salt was cited in a mere 21 percent of cases before vanishing
from the 1990s onwards. Between 2003 and 2013, Windsurfing was the con-
trolling precedent in 81% of the cases (see Figure 4 below).143
142. The frequency count focuses on the citation of precedent.
143. Calculated by taking the number of cases citing to Windsurfing or its progeny as a
fraction of the total number of cases.
Spring 2014] Patent Misuse and Antitrust 327
FIGURE 4. CONTROLLING PRECEDENT (2003 – 2013)
In reformulating patent misuse, the Federal Circuit has taken the leading
role in strengthening the rights of patentees and, as Dan Burk suggested,
may have correspondingly narrowed the instances where misuse can be
found.144 The Federal Circuit seems to see patent rights through the lens of
property rules, rather than liability rules.145 Under the lens of property rules,
patentees are entitled to deny access to their patented technology as a matter
of right, even if a reasonable fee for access is offered.146 In contrast, liability
rules “confer a lesser degree of protection that is akin to tort law: the right to
collect damages caused by another’s intrusion.”147
A court’s view of patents based on a property or liability rule informs its
view of patent misuse in another way. The refusal to grant an injunction has
144. Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1118 (2003).
145. Hoerner, supra note 63, at 684-85 (“[I]t could be argued that the Federal Circuit
appreciates that the patent applicant has made an irrevocable but valuable disclosure, to the
benefit of the public, in his patent application, and that he should be regarded  as having a
property right to enforce it. Misuse destroys that right until purge.”). See generally Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
146. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 145, at 1092 (noting in a non-patent
context that legal rules that create private causes of actions can be sorted into rules that entitle
the claimant to an injunction and rules that entitle the claimant to damages).
147. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 133, at 840.
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been viewed as a form of compulsory license.148 Judges with this view are
probably more concerned with the effects of finding patent misuse than the
refusal to grant an injunction. By rendering a patent unenforceable, patent
misuse makes patentees even worse off because they do not even get a shot
at the reasonable royalties or damages that would accrue to a successful
patent plaintiff in lieu of an injunction. As the Princo court noted, finding
misuse “expansively” will diminish the value of patent rights and discourage
investment in innovation.149
When looking at all misuse cases between 1953 and 2013, the success of
defendants pleading misuse has been on the steady decline (see Figure 5
below).
FIGURE 5. DISTRIBUTION OF CASES OVER TIME AND OUTCOME
148. See Lemley, supra note 124, at 1619 (“In effect, the patent misuse doctrine creates a
scheme of royalty-free compulsory licensing where a patentee is guilty of misuse.”); see also
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. 504 F.3d 1293, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader, J., concur-
ring) (“[C]alling a compulsory license an ‘ongoing royalty’ does not make it any less a com-
pulsory license.”).
149. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In the
licensing context, the doctrine limits a patentee’s right to impose conditions on a licensee that
exceed the scope of the patent right. Because patent misuse is a judge-made doctrine that is in
derogation of statutory patent rights against infringement, this court has not applied the doc-
trine of patent misuse expansively.”).
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FIGURE 6. OUTCOMES IN PATENT MISUSE CASES (1953 – 1962)
Between 1953 – 2013, the percentage of cases finding misuse plum-
meted from a high of 40% between 1953 – 1962 (see Figure 6 above) to a
low of 2% between 2003 – 2013 (see Figure 7 below).
330 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 20:299
FIGURE 7. OUTCOMES IN PATENT MISUSE CASES (2003 – 2013)
Perhaps the irony in the Federal Circuit’s antitrust formulation of patent
misuse is its origin. Just as the Federal Circuit is preeminent in patent law
matters, the Seventh Circuit is the thought leader in all matters relating to
antitrust law, stereotypically seen as an antithesis of patent law.150 The Sev-
enth Circuit is seated in Chicago, the city that lent its name to a noninterven-
tionist school of antitrust policy that continues to permeate present day cases
under the watchful gaze of the court. And, as described below, it was the
most famous member of the Seventh Circuit, Judge Richard Posner, who
first gave misuse its antitrust trappings.
C. Grafting Antitrust: Seventh Circuit Genesis
Anecdotally, stakeholders today have also observed a recent decline in
patent misuse. Those I interviewed observed that a shift in economic think-
ing toward less judicial intervention, and towards a greater reliance in the
mid-1970’s on the free market to iron out anticompetitive kinks caused by
patent rights, resulting in courts to find misuse less frequently.151 As will be
seen, this “economic thinking” was the “Chicago School of Antitrust” which
150. 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 1.3 (“A simplistic assessment of this interac-
tion might proceed as follows: intellectual property rights are monopolies, and antitrust is
designed to prevent monopoly, so the two laws are in conflict.”).
151. LIM, supra note 11, at 55.
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“evolved in part as a critical response to the principal tenets of industrial
organization economics.”152
The Chicago School viewed most markets as self-correcting. Supernor-
mal profits would induce entry and erode market share.153 Daniel Crane can-
didly described the benefits of the Chicago School of antitrust’s approach:
Enforcement is costly and there is a general sense that market dislo-
cations are more quickly corrected than legal dislocations. The Chi-
cago School has the advantage of offering solutions that are not
only simple theoretically, but simple practically. Doing nothing is
much easier than constructing the remedy to a complex and con-
tested liability finding.154
Over time, courts reformulated the antitrust laws with the express mandate
to protect competition and not competitors.155 Antitrust plaintiffs would have
to show an injury to market competition that went beyond economic loss
suffered by individual actors.156 Alleged antitrust violations were also in-
creasingly judged under the rule of reason.157 This required courts to con-
sider both harm and benefits of conduct. Consequently, per se rules that
allowed condemnation based on production of evidence indicating the al-
leged conduct alone, became narrowly circumscribed.158 Finally, plaintiffs
had to show economically rational evidence of harm, rather than mere cir-
cumstantial evidence.159 The impact of these reforms circumscribed antitrust
law considerably.
152. ANDREW GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 66 (2d ed. 2008).
153. Id.
154. Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1911, 1927 (2009).
155. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (“The antitrust laws, however,
were enacted for ‘the protection of competition not competitors,’“).
156. Id. at 489 (An antitrust plaintiff “must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury
of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes
defendants’ acts unlawful.”).
157. William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and
Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 55 (2000) (“The most noteworthy feature of recent
cases concerning collusion or cooperation between firms is the search for manageable analyti-
cal techniques that avoid the complexity of the traditional rule of reason yet supply a richer
factual analysis than per se tests.”).
158. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895 (2007) (rec-
ognizing that per se rules “decrease administrative costs” and acknowledging that they can
also increase costs by “prohibiting procompetitive conduct the antitrust laws should encourage
. . . promoting frivolous suits against legitimate practices” if applied to practices that were not
“manifestly anticompetitive.”).
159. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)
(requiring plaintiffs to establish a genuine issue of material fact of illegal conduct that caused
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The Chicago School advocated reduced intervention by antitrust plain-
tiffs. This culture of non-intervention was reinforced by courts and by anti-
trust enforcers embracing dynamic efficiency.160 Political conservatism in
the 1980s compounded the Chicago School’s successful gospel of noninter-
vention. The Reagan Administration reduced the resources available to the
Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Divi-
sion, leading to fewer investigations.161
Crane observed that Richard Posner, Robert Bork, James Miller, Wil-
liam Baxter and others from the Chicago School influenced the Supreme
Court as well as lower courts to re-evaluate their attitude towards existing
prohibitions.162 Baxter was appointed as head of the Antitrust Division at the
DOJ.163 Miller was appointed as chair of the FTC.164 Bork and Posner were
appointed appellate judges, as were other “very substantial numbers of ideo-
logically sympathetic judges.”165 Indeed, as Crane noted, “[i]f one wants to
identify a Chicago School centrist, there is no more representative scholar
than Richard Posner.”166 And it was Judge Posner who left an indelible mark
of Chicago School ideology on misuse.
Judge Posner wrote his patent misuse decision in USM Corp. v. SPS
Technology, Inc. in 1982, the year the Federal Circuit was established.167
The case concerned a patented industrial fastener. The patentee sued its
competitor-licensee for infringement. The latter alleged that the discrimina-
them a “cognizable injury.” If the facts indicated that plaintiffs’ claims made no economic
sense, they had to offer more persuasive evidence.)
160. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 n.64 (1st Cir.
1994), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010)
(“Wary of undermining the Sherman Act, however, we do not hold that an antitrust plaintiff
can never rebut this presumption, for there may be rare cases in which imposing antitrust
liability is unlikely to frustrate the objectives of the Copyright Act”).
161. Albert A. Foer, The Federal Antitrust Commitment: Providing Resources to Meet
the Challenge, AM. ANTITRUST INST., available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/
whitepaper.pdf (“The election of President Reagan was accompanied by a decisive reorienta-
tion of antitrust under the influence of the Chicago School of economics and law. The federal
antitrust resources and the mission of antitrust were dramatically reduced during the Reagan
years, only to be restored in a slow but steady way under the administrations of President Bush
and President Clinton.”).
162. Crane, supra note 154, at 1912. Ralph J. Winter Jr. and Douglas H. Ginsburg are
also important members of this group. I thank Spencer Waller for this insight.
163. Id. (“Under [Baxter’s] direction, the Justice Department veered away from interven-
tionist stances on vertical restraints and mergers, monopolization, and even horizontal
mergers.”).
164. Id. (“Although slightly more interventionist policies would reemerge in the agencies
during the Clinton Administration, Baxter and Miller’s revolution set the agencies on a durable
new path.”); see also TIMOTHY J. MURIS, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission
and the Future Development of U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 259, 388
(2002).
165. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 152, at 67.
166. Crane, supra note 154, at 1917.
167. USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982)
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tory royalties amounted to patent misuse.168 He wrote that if misuse were not
guided by antitrust law’s concern for anticompetitive conduct, its broad
scope would subject “the rights of patent holders to debilitating uncer-
tainty.”169 As Robert Merges explained, “[t]he thinking [was] that antitrust
has evolved a ‘precise’ methodology for ascertaining when improper market
leverage is being used by a patentee . . . and that the relatively imprecise
‘equitable’ doctrine of misuse only adds confusion and uncertainty to the
scene.”170
In writing Windsurfing, Chief Judge Markey cited Judge Posner’s USM
opinion in fashioning an “antitrust-lite” version of misuse and wrote that
“[r]ecent economic analysis questions the rationale behind holding any li-
censing practice per se anti-competitive.”171 Robert Hoerner noted that
“[t]his was a genuinely startling pronouncement because existing case law,
including controlling Supreme Court precedent, had never held that a rele-
vant market finding or a finding of an anticompetitive effect had been re-
quired to support a finding of extension of the monopoly-type patent
misuse.”172
The Federal Circuit’s version of patent misuse has generally been fol-
lowed by the district courts.173 Some courts have taken the approach that if
the defendant does not show anticompetitive effects, the matter is resolved
in the patentee’s favor without further inquiry into allegations of wrongful
168. Id. at 512.
169. Id. But Judge Posner’s arguments invite the question: why could courts not simply
have relied upon preexisting antitrust laws? After all, the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890,
and by 1942, the Clayton Act, which the lower court of appeals in Morton Salt relied on to
reach the same result was also available to the courts.
170. Leaffer, supra note 52, at 155.
171. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing
USM Corp., 694 F.2d at 510-14); see also Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318,
1329 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Some courts and commentators have questioned the continuing
need for the doctrine of patent misuse, which had its origins before the development of modern
antitrust doctrine); USM Corp., 694 F.2d at 511 (”Since the antitrust laws as currently inter-
preted reach every practice that could impair competition substantially, it is not easy to define
a separate role for a doctrine also designed to prevent an anticompetitive practice—the abuse
of a patent monopoly.“).
172. Hoerner, supra note 63, at 697; see also Brett Aaron Mangrum, Casenote, Patent
Misuse – A Questionable Permission of Licensing Arrangements that Tie Down the Equitable
Scales, 60 SMU L. REV. 307, 309 (2007) (noting that “the Federal Circuit pulled out of thin air
the additional ‘anticompetitive effect’ requirement for a finding of patent misuse.”).
173. See e.g., Home Gambling Network, Inc. v. Piche, No. 2:05-CV-00610-DAE-VCF,
2013 WL 5492568, at *11 (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 2013) (quoting Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel
Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (“Patent misuse occurs when a patentee tries to
‘impermissibly broaden[ ] the physical or temporal scope’ of the patent grant with anticompe-
titive effect.”); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-
00740(AJT/TRJ), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177836, at *32 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013) (“The
concept of patent misuse is premised on the existence of an enforceable patent, and the use of
the monopoly power that accompanies such a patent, to extract concessions that exceed the
temporal or subject matter scope of that monopoly power.”).
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conduct, even when it may indicate an abuse of the patent system.174 At least
one district court has expanded the market power requirement for tying alle-
gations to other forms of misuse allegations, raising the threshold defendants
must cross beyond what Congress had proscribed.175
In Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Wi-LAN, Inc., the licensee ar-
gued that the licensor was attempting to expand the scope of that license to
include products not covered by the patent.176 The district court equated the
threat to terminate a pre-existing license to a tying arrangement, and re-
quired the defendant to show market power.177 By interpreting a threat to
terminate as equating a tying arrangement, any ex post condition including
grantbacks, price-fixing, and output reduction arrangements, could be
shoehorned into a tying rubric.
Looking at Figure 8 below, district court cases have formed a larger
proportion of cases in the 2003–2013 period compared to any other period.
This trend may indicate that parties are better able to satisfactorily resolve
their differences without seeking review in a higher court. It could also show
a stabilization of misuse law over the years, therefore requiring less error
correction by an appellate court. If this is so, then it indicates that the Fed-
eral Circuit’s harmonizing of patent law may be a stabilizing factor. The
dominance of district court cases from the Seventh Circuit (see Figure 9
below), where influential Chicago School antitrust judges like Judges Posner
and Wood have presided over some misuse appeals, could have been another
contributing factor to the infusing of patent misuse with antitrust
jurisprudence.178
174. See e.g., Seaboard Int’l, Inc. v. Cameron Int’l Corp. No. 1:13-CV-00281-MLH-
SKO, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 106784, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 30, 2013) (finding no misuse despite
disclaiming subject matter during prosecution of patents in suit because “Cameron has failed
to sufficiently allege that Seaboard’s actions have had anticompetitive effects”); see also Home
Gambling Network, 2013 WL 5492568, at *12 (“Because Plaintiffs bring a claim for breach of
contract to enforce provisions of a license agreement that impermissibly encompasses subject
matter they affirmatively surrendered during the course of patent prosecution, the doctrine of
patent misuse bars their claim.”).
175. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012) (“No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for
infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of
misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of . . . conditioned the license of any
rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in
another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the
patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on
which the license or sale is conditioned.”).
176. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co. v. Wi-Lan, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7900(SAS), 2013 WL
2322675, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2013).
177. Id.
178. See Cnty. Materials Corp. v. Allan Block Corp., 502 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 2007);
USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982) (opinion by Judge Posner); see
also LIM, supra note 11, at 335 (discussing data that shows antitrust policy permeates district
court and appellate cases at the Seventh Circuit).
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FIGURE 8. CASE DISTRIBUTION (BY LEVEL) (1953 – 2013)
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FIGURE 9. CASE DISTRIBUTION (BY CIRCUIT) (1953 – 2013)
From the 1980s through to early 2000s, the pendulum swung in the di-
rection of strong patent rights. Antitrust law was kept under a tight leash by
the courts. Patent misuse was a waning defense. More recent antitrust juris-
prudence has moved away from per se prohibitions common during the mid-
dle of the twentieth century.179 But just because old Supreme Court
precedent employing the per se approach fell out of favor, it did not auto-
matically mean that old misuse precedent is also bad because courts during
that time often used similar rhetoric when talking about patent
“monopolies.”180
Moreover, a leading treatise pointed out that, although Judge Posner’s
exhortations are “legitimate from an economic standpoint,” “patent misuse is
not only about ‘monopolistic abuse,’ but also serves as an internal constraint
on efforts to expand the patent system beyond its bounds.”181 In Chief Jus-
tice Roberts’s dissent in Actavis, he too noted that, although antitrust law
sought to determine whether the practice harmed competition, patent policy
encompasses a set of judgments about the proper tradeoff between competi-
179. See, e.g., Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 157, at 55.
180. See e.g. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 451 (1940) (discuss-
ing the “patent monopoly.”).
181. 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 3.2.
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tion and the incentive to innovate over the long run,”182 and that
“[a]ntitrust’s rule of reason was not designed for such judgments and is not
adept at making them.”183
One thing is certain. The Supreme Court’s and Congress’ views on pat-
ents are changing. The Court’s reversal of the Federal Circuit in Mayo Col-
laborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. was accompanied by an
expressed concern over “a danger that the grant of patents . . . will inhibit
future innovation . . . or otherwise forecloses more future invention than the
underlying discovery could reasonably justify.”184 Echoing Morton Salt, the
Court expressed concern over the need to limit patentees to the scope of their
patent grant.185 Prometheus follows a number of earlier decisions to reverse
the standards put in place by the Federal Circuit that were deemed too pro-
patentee.186 Congress also has considered a slew of legislative initiatives to
introduce more competition in the pharmaceutical industry and curb vexa-
tious litigation.187 But the development that best indicates a swing away
from patent deference is the Supreme Court’s ruling in Actavis.188
IV. REFORMULATING THE PATENT-ANTITRUST DOUBLE HELIX
Actavis is the latest in a string of cases signaling a concerted effort by
the Supreme Court to narrow the reach and scope of patent rights. After
explaining why Actavis is correct both as a matter of law and judicial
182. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2246 (2013) (quoting 12 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 101, § 7.3).
183. Id.
184. Mayo Collaborative Servs., v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012).
185. Id.
186. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
(reversing the Federal Circuit’s decision on gene patents, holding that isolated DNA sequences
did not qualify as patentable subject matter); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398 (2007) (raising the threshold required by patent applicants or owners to show that their
inventions were nonobvious); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (re-
versing Federal Circuit precedent automatically granting injunctions upon a finding of in-
fringement, requiring courts instead to weigh the equities as in non-patent injunction requests).
187. See, e.g., Andrew Baluch, Patent Reform 2014: A Comprehensive Guide to Current
Patent Reform Developments in Congress, the Executive Branch, the Courts and the States
(March 24, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2414306.
188. Thomas Frongillo et al., Reverse Payment Settlements in Jeopardy Following Su-
preme Court Ruling in FTC v. Actavis, FISH & RICHARDSON (June 19, 2013), http://www.fr.
com/FTC-Actavis-Reverse-Payment-Settlement/ (“[W]hen viewed in conjunction with the
Court’s recent decisions in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., and
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., [Actavis] may signal the be-
ginning of a trend in which the Court is narrowing both the reach and scope of the patent
laws”) (footnotes omitted). 2014 saw the Court accepting more patent cases. See, e.g., Lime-
light Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 895 (2014) (whether a party should be
held liable for inducting another party to infringe a patent if that party did not perform every
claim in the patent); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014) (on the
proper standard for indefiniteness).
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rulemaking, this Part considers the re-emergence of a patent-skeptical Su-
preme Court and its implications for the patent-antitrust interface and patent
misuse.189  It then turns to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kimble and ob-
serves that while the court reached the correct result, it misunderstood Bru-
lotte and overlooked the patent policy lever function of patent misuse.190
A. The Patent-Antitrust Interface after Actavis
Actavis seemed to contain the elements of a straightforward antitrust
indictment: a dominant drug company paid potential rivals millions of dol-
lars not to compete at the cost of public access to cheaper medicine.191 The
interests of these rivals, once aligned with those of the public, had been
twisted to align with its former rival and current paymaster. According to an
FTC report, these settlements cost consumers $3.5 billion a year.192 The
Court pointed accusingly to the Hatch-Waxman Act as a significant reason
for these settlements.193
Ironically, the Act was enacted to accelerate the entry of generic drugs
into the market194 under an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA). The
Act allows generics to piggy-back on the prior regulatory approval obtained
by brand name drugs without undertaking costly and time-consuming
clinical trials of their own, if the generic drugs contained the same active
ingredients and were bioequivalent.195 Under a “Paragraph IV” filing, a ge-
neric can avoid waiting until the pioneer’s patent expires by showing that the
patent was invalid or not infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the
generic’s drug.196
189. See generally Daryl Lim, Reverse Payments: Life After Actavis, 45 INT’L. REV. INT.
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1  (2013) (noting closer scrutiny of settlements post-Actavis and the
opportunity it provides to catalyze dialogue between the patent and antitrust bars).
190. Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 58 (2005) (“Patent policy levers are
patent doctrines that can be adjusted to implement particular patent policies or patent
theories.”).
191. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013) (“Solvay agreed to pay mil-
lions of dollars to each generic—$12 million in total to Paddock; $60 million in total to Par;
and an estimated $19–$30 million annually, for nine years, to Actavis.”).
192. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY FOR DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANIES PAY-OFFS COST
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 2 (Jan 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-
commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
193. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235 (pointing out that the 180-day exclusivity period blocks
subsequent challenges).
194. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt.1, at 14 (1984). (seeking “to make available more low cost
generic drugs.”).
195. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A), 355(j)(8)(B) (2012).
196. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii); see also Barry et al., supra note 53, at 27 (“ANDA
litigation transpires when a generic drug manufacturer files with the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) an ANDA paragraph IV certification challenging a brand drug manufacturer’s
patent(s). Damages are rarely, if ever, awarded because the alleged infringer does not generally
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To entice generic challengers to step into the arena, the first-filing ge-
neric wins 180 days of shared exclusivity in the marketplace with the patent
owner.197 The brand is able to obtain a 30-month stay on generic approval,
and no other generics can enter during the first filer’s 180-day period.198
With the marginal cost of drug manufacture being almost negligible, and
with little or no generic competition (unless simultaneous generic filing oc-
curs), that period assures the first filer a bountiful windfall.199 Under these
circumstances, a rational first filer would only accept a payment to settle that
was at least as great as the expected value of production.200 Further, most
first filers bear no risk of being liable for damages even if they lose, unless
they have begun manufacturing before they win the challenge.
Between 1992 and 2012 the number of ANDA challenges has risen
steadily from seventeen to seventy-seven over five-year intervals (see Figure
10 below). While fluctuating between 2006 and 2012, the success rates for
patentees have generally risen (see Figure 11 below).
make any infringing sales prior to the filing of the litigation. However, the economic ramifica-
tions of ANDA litigation are significant because of the potential for lost patent protection of
highly profitable brand name drugs. In addition, the first generic filer of a successful patent
challenge is awarded a period of exclusivity in the generic drug market.”).
197. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
198. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
199. Indeed, the Court noted that most of the generic’s profits for the drug were made
during that period. See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013) (citing C. Scott
Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Prob-
lem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1579 (2006)) (“During that period of exclusivity no other ge-
neric can compete with the brand-name drug. If the first-to-file generic manufacturer can
overcome any patent obstacle and bring the generic to market, this 180–day period of exclusiv-
ity can prove valuable, possibly “worth several hundred million dollars.”).
200. Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 24.
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FIGURE 10. ANDA CASES (1995 – 2012)201
201. Barry et al., supra note 53, at 27.
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FIGURE 11. ANDA SUCCESS RATES (1995 – 2012)
Notwithstanding the success patentees enjoyed, the number of payments
they made to their generic competitors has increased from three in 2011 to
forty in 2013 (see Figure 12 below).
FIGURE 12. SETTLEMENTS BETWEEN PATENT OWNERS AND POTENTIAL
GENERIC COMPETITORS202
202. FED. TRADE COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FISCAL YEAR 2012: A
REPORT BY THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION 2 (January 2013). For a critique of this data, see
Kevin E. Noonan, FTC Releases Another Report on Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements
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In assessing whether patent infringement settlements involving reverse
payments violated the antitrust laws, the Actavis Court found that the pay-
ment may “provide strong evidence that the patentee seeks to induce the
generic challenger to abandon its claim with a share of its monopoly profits
that would otherwise be lost in the competitive market.”203 It also found that
the Hatch-Waxman Act’s “general procompetitive thrust” of facilitating
challenges to patent validity and the requirement for parties to report the
settlement terms to antitrust agencies indicates a general policy favoring set-
tlement of disputes.204
The reverse payments had the effect of shifting the alignment of inter-
ests of generics from the side of consumers to the brand name companies,
thereby corrupting the process by which cheap drugs were intended to be
encouraged.205 The Court summed up its position that “challenged terms and
conditions [were] unlawful unless patent law policy offsets the antitrust law
policy strongly favoring competition.”206
The Actavis Court’s analysis sets out the burden of proof and the evi-
dence needed to carry that burden. The plaintiff carries the burden of prov-
ing the settlement violates antitrust laws, but enjoys a more abbreviated
process if the evidence warrants it.
In particular, the Court noted that the “size of the payment from a
branded drug manufacturer to a prospective generic is itself a strong indica-
tor of power.”207 Such evidence is a more direct measurement of market
power, and is superior to a more indirect measurement of that power through
market definition.208 As a proxy of competitive harm, the Court pointed out
that “the likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about anticompetitive ef-
fects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated
future litigation costs, its independence from other services for which it
might represent payment, and the lack of any other convincing justifica-
tion.”209 This proxy obviates the need to analyze which party would have
prevailed in the underlying infringement action.
in ANDA Litigation, PATENT DOCS (Jan 17, 2013), http://www.patentdocs.org/2013/01/ftc-
releases-another-report-on-reverse-payment-settlement-agreements-in-anda-litigation.html.
203. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235.
204. Id. at 2225.
205. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 39-41 (2009).
206. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2233.
207. Id. at 2236.
208. Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 24 (“In a competitive market the value of keeping a
competitor out is close to zero, but becomes higher as price-cost margins increase.  Further, in
these cases the duration of the monopoly is not infinite, but is limited by the remaining dura-
tion of the patent.  A rational patentee would pay no more than the anticipated value of monop-
oly returns over the remaining period, so a large payment surely indicates power.”).
209. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237; see Monte Cooper et al., Reverse Payment Settlements
Now Subject to Antitrust Scrutiny, but Lower Courts Left to Fill in the Blanks, ORRICK (Jun 18
2013), http://www.orrick.com/Events-and-Publications/Pages/Reverse-Payment-Settlements-
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As a matter of law, the Court’s reasoning is correct. It is hornbook law
that the antitrust laws prohibit the exclusion of both actual and potential
competitors,210 as well as patent infringement settlements that unreasonably
restrain competition.211 Section 211 of the Patent Act is also clear that
“[n]othing in this chapter shall be deemed to convey to any person immunity
from civil or criminal liability, or to create any defense to actions, under any
antitrust law.”212
Further, commentators have cautioned against writing “exceptions for
certain conduct or industries,” since “[o]ur antitrust laws are written broadly
enough to apply to all industries and to conduct that changes over time[.]”213
Notwithstanding that the Patent Act expressly permits assignments, the rou-
tine application of Section 7 of the Clayton Act to asset acquisitions of pat-
ents, shows that antitrust law permits only assignments that are not found to
be anticompetitive.214
As a matter of judicial rulemaking, the Court’s view has the force of
logic behind it. Former foes in a patent trial are now allies in the antitrust
Now-Subject-to-Antitrust-Scrutiny-But-Lower-Courts-Left-to-Fill-in-the-Blanks.aspx (“The
big opportunity for brands and generics wishing to settle claims is to develop the idea that
payments to a generic for services (or for anything else, for that matter) may legitimately be
made in connection with settlement, even if unrelated to the product at issue. The agreements
in such cases would have to be commercially reasonable and negotiated at arm’s length, but
perhaps there would be no other requirement.”); see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., FTC v. Ac-
tavis: The Patent-Antitrust Intersection Revisited 54 (Tulane Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law and
Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 13-19, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2348075 (warning of more agreements delaying generic en-
try to the last six months of the patent term. This would indicate that “generics are not seri-
ously challenging weak patents, but simply settling for the guarantee of 180-day generic
exclusivity the settlement ensures, rather than risk losing the generic exclusivity altogether in
litigation”).
210. Palmer v. BRG of Ga. Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990) (agreement that potential
entrant would stay out of competitor’s market unlawful per se). Palmer was cited with ap-
proval in Actavis. In addition, both the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the DOJ/FTC
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property treat firms as potential competi-
tors to the incumbent as long as their entry is reasonably probable. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE &
FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 9.2 (2010), available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html (“Entry is likely if it would be profita-
ble, accounting for the assets, capabilities, and capital needed and the risks involved, including
the need for the entrant to incur costs that would not be recovered if the entrant later exits.”);
U.S. JUSTICE DEP’T AND THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENS-
ING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES § 3.1 n.14 (1995) (“A firm will be treated as a
likely potential competitor if there is evidence that entry by that firm is reasonably probable in
the absence of the licensing arrangement.”).
211. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 200 (1963) (“[S]uch collusion to
secure a monopoly grant runs afoul of the Sherman Act’s prohibitions against conspiracies in
restraint of trade*—if not bad per se, then such agreements are at least presumptively bad.”).
212. 35 U.S.C. § 211 (2012).
213. Karen Bokat, Reverse-Payment Settlement Agreements Roundtable, ANTITRUST
HEALTH CARE CHRON. 11, 21 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2246466.
214. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
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trial. They control the evidence relevant to the patent trial and have every
incentive to defeat the antitrust plaintiff they now face together. The settling
parties are best situated to provide and substantiate the settlement and should
be made to do so.215 At the same time, keeping the ultimate burden of proof
on the antitrust plaintiff, the rebuttable presumption avoids condemning
agreements with net competitive benefits since in these cases the court will
find for the settling parties.
As a practical matter, patentees can continue to settle litigation disputes
with generic drug companies as long as the payment has “offsetting or re-
deeming virtues” which “may amount to no more than a rough approxima-
tion of the litigation expenses saved through the settlement.”216 Patentees can
also show that the payment reflects “compensation for other services that the
generic has promised to perform—such as distributing the patented item or
helping to develop a market for that item.”217 Allowing settlements to divide
215. Thomas Cotter, FTC v. Actavis: An Analysis, LEXOLOGY, (Feb 25 2013), http://
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ca4c07f7-6258-4f3c-afd8-6acedb3d7681 (“Other
relevant evidence may include the presence of other agreements between the settling parties
(for example, authorizing the defendant to market an authorized generic drug, or licensing the
defendant other intellectual property rights), which should be taken into account for the limited
purpose of accurately estimating the value of the consideration flowing from plaintiff to defen-
dant; whether the generic is ‘cash-strapped,’ and therefore willing to accept a later entry date
to remain in business; whether the patent owner sought, and succeeded in obtaining, a prelimi-
nary injunction against the generic manufacturer; whether the generic manufacturer agrees to
waive its 180-day exclusivity, thus removing the risk of a bottleneck potentially blocking other
ANDA applicants; and whether the patent in suit has withstood other validity challenges aris-
ing after the filing of the settled action.”).
216. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013). One possibility for a redeem-
ing virtue mentioned by the Third Circuit in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197,
218 (3d Cir. 2012) was a payment enabling “a cash-starved generic manufacturer to avoid
bankruptcy and begin marketing a generic drug.“ However, Glynn S Lunney, Jr. warned
against adopting this because “we will end up with thinly capitalized generics specifically
established to pursue just one case, so that the avoid bankruptcy argument would always be
available.” Lunney, Jr., supra note 209, at 34 n.130; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Antitrust
Implications of Patent Settlements Involving Reverse Payments:  Defending a Rebuttable Pre-
sumption of Illegality in Light of Some Recent Scholarship, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1069, 1073-74
(2004) (arguing that reverse payments may be made for reducing other risks, such as the
defendant’s potential insolvency, or could reflect the parties’ different toleration for risk or
asymmetric information in evaluating the likelihood of success at trial).
217. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. But see Lunney, supra note 209, at 33-34 (arguing that
policing the line in the first instance “seems reasonably straightforward”, but the latter “is
likely to prove far more difficult”). Lunney predicts that this licensed entry model “will be-
come the preferred method for insulating weak patents from generic challenge” explaining that
“[w]hile different in form, such a settlement structure essentially duplicates the anticompetitive
effects of a reverse payment settlement, except the reverse payment comes in the form of a
division of expected rent.” Id. at 53; see also id. at 35 (“While a traditional percentage of
revenue royalty license would leave the generic with an incentive to cheat and sell the generic
drug at a lower price in order to maximize its own profits, the patent holder can discourage
such cheating by: (i) setting an appropriate per-dose license fee, so that the license fee plus the
marginal cost of the drug equaled the drug’s profit-maximizing price; (ii) restricting the quan-
tity of the generic drug that the licensee may sell; or (iii) setting a minimum resale price for the
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the remaining patent term without compensation to the generic would reflect
the strength of the parties’ arguments at trial.218
The Actavis dissent preferred the Eleventh Circuit’s view that patents
essentially create an antitrust-free zone within their scope.219 Under this
view, only in narrow instances such as sham litigation and fraudulent patent
procurement would antitrust scrutiny be warranted.220 The dissent’s reticence
toward allowing antitrust scrutiny echoes the Court’s earlier position in Ver-
izon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.221 Writing for
the Verizon majority, Justice Scalia declined to apply antitrust law where
sector-specific rules regulated conditions for access to a telephone network.
Like Chief Justice Roberts, whom he joined in the Actavis dissent, he was
concerned about the costs of false convictions222 and doubted the Court’s
ability to fashion a satisfactory remedy.223 That level of caution may have
explained Trinko’s feeble agnosticism toward the essential facilities doc-
generic drug in the license.”). The proper response is that the legal form of such agreements do
not alter their economic reality. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (requiring antitrust analysis
to be “based on the economic realities of the reverse payment settlement rather than labels
applied by the settling parties”); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-
59 (1977) (requiring that antitrust analysis “be based upon demonstrable economic effect
rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing”).
218. Andrew D. Regan & Charles E. Miller, Hatch-Waxman Litigation Post-Actavis:
Crafting a Pro-Competitive Settlement Agreement, 6 LANDSLIDE 52, 53 (2013) (“[T]he formu-
lation of a patent-term split provides flexibility during negotiations. The split ratio can be
rationally based on the strengths and weaknesses of the respective positions in the underlying
patent litigation.”); see also id. at 4 (“By having the brand name exchange payment for ser-
vices such as research, clinical testing, manufacturing, sales, marketing, or other services, and
receiving an abatement of the generic’s patent challenge in return, the underlying interests of
all parties can be addressed. At minimum, the brand name protects current sales and maintains
market share. Ideally, market share is increased through enhanced market penetration (e.g.,
generic promotes patented drug), increased sales due to reduced price (e.g., generic produces
patented drug at a lower cost), or FDA approval for different indications (e.g., generic con-
ducts additional clinical testing of patented drug). On the other side, the generic gains the
certainty of an earlier market entry, safety from infringement liability for “at risk” entry, and
payment for services that involve the cultivation of necessary commercial skills.”).
219. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2239 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that “a patent
carves out an exception to the applicability of antitrust laws”).
220. Id.
221. 540 U.S. 398 (2004); see Nicolas Petit & Alfonso Lamadrid de Pablo, Reverse Pay-
ments (Pay for Delay Settlements) in EU and US Antitrust Law (Part I), CHILLIN’COMPETITION
(Jul 2, 2013), http://chillingcompetition.com/2013/07/02/ (“[Actavis] appears to be at odds
with the principles governing the interface between sector-specific regulation and antitrust
established in Trinko.”).
222. Verizon Commc’ns , 540 U.S. at 414 (“Against the slight benefits of antitrust inter-
vention here, we must weigh a realistic assessment of its costs. . . . Mistaken inferences and the
resulting false condemnations ‘are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the
antitrust laws are designed to protect.’”).
223. Id. at 414-15 (“Effective remediation of violations of regulatory sharing require-
ments will ordinarily require continuing supervision of a highly detailed decree. We think that
Professor Areeda got it exactly right: ‘No court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot
explain or adequately and reasonably supervise. The problem should be deemed irremedia[ble]
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trine.224 Chief Justice Roberts was concerned that lower courts would be
caught up in a web of “turducken” trials. These trials required issues of
validity and infringement must be litigated as intermediate steps to assess
whether a settlement.225
However, there are several reasons why the dissent’s approach is
flawed. First, although it has the appeal of simplicity, the “scope of the pat-
ent” approach assumes away the issues of validity and scope central to the
Hatch-Waxman challenge.226 The “scope of the patent” test has the potential
to render every reverse payment within a patent term per se legal. As a
matter of record, “no court applying the scope of the patent test has ever
permitted a reverse payment antitrust case to go to trial.”227
An FTC study showed at least 73% of generics prevailed in paragraph
IV challenges between 1992 and 2000.228 The scope of the patent test im-
pedes such challenges and allows patent owners to exploit poor quality or
invalid patents. Jefferson earlier warned that a disproportionate legal monop-
oly was “more an embarrassment than an advantage to society.”229 Allowing
a patent owner to buy off the rival most interested in mounting that chal-
lenge creates a prima facie impediment to the sort of technological progress
demanded by the Constitution in return for that monopoly.
by antitrust law when compulsory access requires the court to assume the day-to-day controls
characteristic of a regulatory agency.’”).
224. Id. at 411 (“We have never recognized such a doctrine, and we find no need either
to recognize it or to repudiate it here.”) (citation omitted).
225. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2476 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007)) (noting that antitrust’s rule of reason “[S]ubject[s] basic questions of patent law to an
unbounded inquiry under antitrust law, with its treble damages and famously burdensome
discovery.”).
226. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197 (3d. Cir. 2012); see also Bokat,
supra note 213, at 17 (“The current focus of the Second, Eleventh and Federal Circuits on the
scope-of-the patent test grants undue deference to patent rights and diminishes the value of
competition in our economy. These courts assume too readily that the patents at issue are valid
and infringed. They lose sight of the fact that the patent holder bears the burden of proving
infringement and that, while there is an assumption of validity, a large percentage of cases,
more than half, are won by generic companies challenging the validity of patents.”); Mark R.
Patterson, Leveraging Information About Patents: Settlements, Portfolios, and Holdups, 50
HOUS. L. REV. 483, 500 (2012) (“[T]he scope argument in this context is entirely circular. If
the patent is valid, an agreement that delays entry of a competitor that uses the patented tech-
nology is within the scope of the patent, but validity is exactly the issue on which legality of
the agreement turns, so relying on scope is assuming the result of the argument. As suggested
above, the courts here fail to appreciate that the uncertainty that the patentee is exploiting is
neither within nor without the scope of the patent, but makes it impossible to know whether
the patent is legally valid, i.e., whether it even makes sense to talk of the patent’s scope.”)
(footnote omitted).
227. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214.
228. FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN
FTC STUDY 16 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf.
229. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 90.
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Second, the “scope of the patent” test encourages rent-seeking by the
settling parties. Einer Elhauge and Alex Krueger warn that settling parties
“maximize joint profits with settlements that declare the validity of which-
ever patent ends last, even if the other patent is actually more likely to be
valid.” Settling parties could create
a stream of weak (but non-sham) patents precisely for the purpose
of enabling these last-to-expire settlements that preclude competi-
tion as long as possible. Such a stream could even allow horizontal
competitors to create a chain of reverse payment settlements that
span multiple patent periods, trading the monopoly power back and
forth between each other and splitting the profits with their counter-
part throughout.230
Looking ahead, both antitrust and patent attorneys agree that Actavis
will ripple beyond the Hatch-Waxman context.231 Christine C. Levin and
Irene Ayzenberg-Lyman suggest that patent licensing agreements will be-
come more vulnerable as they are “often viewed as anticipatory settlements,
for they are commonly entered into to avoid or resolve patent disputes,” and
therefore “an antitrust plaintiff, following the rationale of Actavis, may try to
challenge a patent licensing agreement by arguing that the consideration in-
volved does not reflect the value of the patent rights granted under the agree-
ment, and instead includes a premium not to compete with full force.”232
Mark J. Botti et al. concur, noting that field of use restrictions will face
greater scrutiny because “under Actavis, the question needs to be asked now
230. Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 283, 290 (2012); see also Cotter, supra note 215 (noting that the “scope of patent test”
“make[s] it virtually impossible to condemn reverse payment settlements resulting in generic
exclusion unless the parties overreach by agreeing to restraints on the sales of collateral prod-
ucts . . . notwithstanding the statutory presumption of validity; and in any event that presump-
tion has nothing to do with the separate question of infringement, the burden of proving which
always rests with the patent owner.”).
231. See, e.g., Christine Levin & Irene Ayzenberg-Lyman, U.S. Supreme Court Rejection
of the “Scope of the Patent” Test in FTC v. Actavis has Wide-Ranging Implications, DECHERT
LLP (Jun. 20, 2013), http://sites.edechert.com/10/1446/june-2013/final-onpoint-and-live-anal-
ysis—-how-will-scotus-decision-in-ftc-v.-actavis-impact-you-(1)(1)(2).asp?intEmailSentId=
1361&intRecipientId=100300 (“Antitrust plaintiffs may attempt to use the Actavis decision
outside of the Hatch-Waxman context.”); see also Mark J. Botti et al., Redefining the Border
Between Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Implications of FTC v. Actavis, SQUIRE SANDERS
LLP (Jun. 27, 2013), http://www.squiresanders.com/files/Publication/e175e111-1f90-4a14-
b70d-3fabd626041a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0340eb51-3f36-45bf-88ed-
400b4f4962f6/Redefining-the-Border-Between-Intellectual-Property-and-Antitrust-Implica-
tions-of-FTC-v-Actavis.pdf (“Both the majority and the dissent relied and shed new light on
older antitrust decisions involving patents, making clear that the Actavis decision would apply
to patent pools, cross-licensing arrangements, and more routine patent licensing decisions.”).
232. Levin & Ayzenberg-Lyman, supra note 231.
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whether a field of use restriction ‘within the scope of the patent’ raises sig-
nificant antitrust concerns in particular circumstances.”233
More fundamentally, the shift in Actavis stems from more than a chang-
ing view of patent rights. It also signals a shift in the Court’s view of anti-
trust law itself. The precedents cited by the Court to support its
interventionist position were from the 1960s and earlier, before the advent of
the Chicago School.234 Separately, Crane observed that “[o]ver the past few
decades the Supreme Court has shown relatively little interest in antitrust
cases . . . refus[ing] to review a number of controversial pro-plaintiff lower
court decisions, thus allowing a body of post-Chicago lower court law to
incubate.”235 However, according to Crane, the Chicago School’s “intellec-
tual edifice is in a state of neglect. Its erstwhile paladins are largely dead,
bored with the field, or complacent. Some, like Posner and Easterbrook, con-
tinue to offer the occasional, infrequent antitrust intervention, but without
the zeal of their earlier years.”236 In contrast, Crane notes that “post-Chicago
is lean, hungry, and spoiling for a fight.”237
Professors Andrew Gavil, William Kovacic and Jonathan Baker explain
that the post-Chicago school places a greater emphasis on strategic consider-
ations and use tools such as game theory to explain interdependent behav-
ior.238 More recently, behavioral economics has evolved into an important
pillar of antitrust analysis.239 Post-Chicago jurisprudence “tend[s] to be more
interventionist,” and “question[s] Chicago views that markets commonly
self-correct, entry is commonly easy, firms cannot successfully coordinate
and government intervention can rarely succeed.”240
As Gavil et al. put it, “[a]ntitrust will always be a product of the prevail-
ing economic and political thinking of the times.”241 In this regard, Crane
notes that “judges, politicians, academics, and enforcers—are increasingly
being exposed to post-Chicago views without much of a current Chicago
233. Botti et al., supra note 231 (“While one would expect that traditional antitrust prin-
ciples would protect various terms and conditions used in licensing agreements from antitrust
review, the opinion may well be read to suggest that such standard clauses in patent licensing
agreements as ‘field of use’ restrictions will face greater scrutiny.”).
234. See e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Walker Process Equip., Inc. v.
Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co.,
352 U.S. 457 (1957) ; United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952); Standard Oil
Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931).
235. Crane, supra note 154, at 1930.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 152, at 69.
239. See e.g., Avishalom Tor, Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, 92 TEX. L. REV. 573
(2014).
240. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 152, at 70.
241. Id. at 72.
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counterpunch.”242 Under these circumstances, “Chicago is likely to find a
world increasingly disinclined to accept its articles of faith.”243
The 2008 financial crisis has only hastened this pivot, as even the most
faithful adherents placing trust in markets find themselves hard-pressed to
make their faith attractive to those burned by the ensuing fallout.244 Another
development that same year, the election of President Obama, who cam-
paigned on a platform of increased antitrust enforcement and more afforda-
ble healthcare, now has the FTC’s victory in Actavis as his trophy.245
The most significant aspect of Actavis is the Court’s views on the pat-
ent-antitrust interface, and the implications of those views on patent mis-
use.246 Post-Actavis, antitrust law challenges will feature with greater
prominence in future patent infringement cases. The Court held that “patent
and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the ‘scope of the pat-
ent monopoly’,”247 and that “whether a particular restraint lies ‘beyond the
limits of the patent monopoly’ is a conclusion that flows from that analysis
and not . . . its starting point.”248 The Court also found important that “the
public interest in granting patent monopolies’ exists only to the extent that
‘the public is given a novel and useful invention’ in consideration for its
grant.’”249 Where this interest is violated, “the Court has struck down overly
restrictive patent licensing agreements—irrespective of whether those agree-
ments produced supra-patent-permitted revenues.”250
With the orthodoxy of the “scope of the patent” rubric shattered, the
correctness of Windsurfing and its progeny must be scrutinized. Just as the
Eleventh Circuit was wrong to omit antitrust policy in determining patent
scope from its antitrust analysis, the Federal Circuit was wrong to omit pat-
ent policy from its patent misuse analysis. Actavis questions the Federal Cir-
cuit jurisprudence echoing the dissent’s view that patents were subject to
242. Crane, supra note 154, at 1930.
243. Id. at 1932.
244. See id.
245. See id. at 1933; see also Jeff Mason, Obama Eyes Media with Promise of Antitrust
Push, REUTERS (May 18, 2008), available at http://www.enn.com/top_stories/article/36508
(reporting that presidential candidate Obama stated on the campaign trail: “We’re going to
have an antitrust division in the Justice Department that actually believes in antitrust law. We
haven’t had that for the last seven, eight years.”); Robert Laszweski, A Detailed Analysis of
Barack Obama’s Health Care Reform Plan, THE HEALTH CARE BLOG  (Mar 21, 2008) http://
thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2008/03/21/a-detailed-analysis-of-barack-obamas-health-care-re-
form-plan/.
246. Botti & Hoke, supra note 4 (“The Actavis decision would be noteworthy for its
intended impact alone on reverse-payment settlement agreements in the pharmaceuticals in-
dustry, making those settlements more open to antitrust challenge. The opinion has broader
implications, however, for the basic intersection of intellectual property law and antitrust.”).
247. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2225 (2013).
248. Id. at 2231–32.
249. Id. at 2241 (citation omitted).
250. Id. at 2232.
350 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 20:299
antitrust scrutiny only in the case of Walker Process fraud or sham litiga-
tion,251 and calls into question the circumstances under which royalty pay-
ments beyond the duration of a patent can be patent misuse. This was the
question the Ninth Circuit had to answer in Kimble.
B. Kimble: What if Brulotte Was Right?
An enterprising attorney named Stephen Kimble invented a toy that al-
lowed its user to shoot foam-string, and subsequently obtained a patent for it
(see Figure 13 below).252 When Marvel began making “Web Blaster” Spi-
der-Man toys, Kimble sued Marvel for patent infringement.253 The district
court awarded Kimble 3.5% of net product sales on the Web Blaster.254 The
parties eventually settled the case, with Marvel agreeing to pay $500,000
and 3% of “net product sales” to Kimble for a bundle of intellectual property
rights, of which the patent license was one component. The settlement pro-
vided no end date for the royalty payments indefinitely. Over the years,
Kimble earned more than six million dollars in royalties.255 Cordial relations
broke down when Kimble sought royalties over the purchase price of newer
toys when the invention “was only one-fifth of the functionality of the
toy.”256 In response, Marvel sought a declaration that it was not obligated to
pay Kimble following the patent’s expiration.257
251. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“As
we recently observed in Glass Equipment Development Inc. v. Besten, Inc., a patent owner
who brings suit to enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making, using, or selling
the claimed invention is exempt from the antitrust laws, even though such a suit may have an
anticompetitive effect, unless the infringement defendant proves one of two conditions. First,
he may prove that the asserted patent was obtained through knowing and willful [Walker
Process] fraud. . . . Or he may demonstrate that the infringement suit was a mere sham to
cover what is actually no more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relation-
ships of a competitor.”) (citations omitted).
252. U.S. Patent No. 5,072,856 (filed May 25, 1990) (issued Dec. 17, 1991); Tim Hull,
Marvel Fights Spider-Man Toy Royalty Issue, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Dec. 10, 2012),
http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/12/10/52991.htm.
253. Kimble v. Marvel Enters. Inc., 727 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The Web Blaster
allowed that toy’s user to shoot foam string from a can mounted on the user’s wrist by activat-
ing a trigger in the user’s hand. Like Kimble’s toy, the Web Blaster was packaged with a
glove, but unlike Kimble’s toy, the Web Blaster glove was purely cosmetic—a Web Blaster
user did not need the glove in order to shoot foam string.”).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 859.
256. Hull, supra note 252.
257. Kimble, 727 F.3d at 859.
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FIGURE 13. TOY WEB-SHOOTING GLOVE258
258. U.S. Patent No. 5,072,856 (filed May 25, 1990).
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Writing for a unanimous Ninth Circuit panel, Judge Callahan affirmed
the district court, holding that the hybrid licensing agreement “encompassing
inseparable patent and non-patent rights [was] unenforceable beyond the ex-
piration date of the underlying patent, unless the agreement provides a dis-
counted rate for the non-patent rights or some other clear indication that the
royalty at issue was in no way subject to patent leverage.”259
The court found that “the agreement plainly involved one royalty rate
for both patent and Web Blaster rights, with no discount or other clear indi-
cation that the Web Blaster royalties were not subject to patent leverage.”260
It also noted that the agreement “did not include a discounted rate for the
alleged non-patent rights,”261and it explained that “the point of requiring a
discount from the patent-protected rate is that it shows that the royalty at
issue was not subject to patent leverage.”262
The court also found that at the time of the negotiations, Kimble “was
challenging the district court’s decision and likely derived some amount of
leverage from his patent infringement appeal.” Even if this patent leverage
was significantly less than the leverage that Kimble derived from the jury
verdict on his contract claim, Brulotte applied because it was impossible to
tell “what the bargaining position of the parties might have been and what
resultant arrangement might have emerged had the provision for post-expira-
tion royalties been divorced from the patent and nowise subject to its
leverage.”263
The Kimble court’s invocation of Brulotte merits a brief explanation.
Brulotte v. Thys Co. concerned hop-picking machines that were sold for a
flat fee along with licenses requiring seasonal royalty payments for their use
to be paid indefinitely.264 The licenses prohibited buyers from assigning the
licenses or using the machines outside Yakima County in the State of Wash-
ington. The Supreme Court found “a patentee’s use of a royalty agreement
that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se.”265
Although recognizing the legitimacy of using the patent as leverage to
exact royalties as high as possible during the life of the patent, the Court
259. Id. at 857.
260. Id. at 864.
261. Id.
262. Id. See also id. at 865 (The Ninth Circuit dismissed Kimble’s argument that the 3%
rate represented a “discount” from the district court judgment’s 31/2% rate because “[t]he rates
in the agreement at issue are what matters, not the rates in the long-since vacated judg-
ment. . . . Moreover, where a first rate is higher and is not subject to patent leverage that does
not show that a second, lower rate encompassing both patent-protected and non-patent pro-
tected rights was not subject to patent leverage. The ‘discount’ from the rate in the judgment to
the Settlement Agreement reflected the fact that Kimble might not prevail on appeal, not that
the rights at issue were not subject to patent leverage.”).
263. Id. at 866.
264. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
265. Id. at 32.
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deemed it improper to use that same leverage to exact lower royalties for a
term extending beyond the life of the patent.266 The Court drew on the fact
that the Constitution prescribed exclusive rights to inventors for “limited
times,” as well as Section 154 of the Patent Act which provided a fixed
period, which at that time was seventeen years.267 Once the patent expired,
those once exclusive rights “become public property,”268 and extending the
patent monopoly post-expiration “runs counter to the policy and purpose of
the patent laws” regardless of the “legal device” employed.269
The Brulotte Court was not merely concerned about private rights but
also the public interest. It analogized the term extension to tying, and
pointed out that the license was an attempt to “leverage” the patent tie to the
period after the period had expired.270 The Court concluded that the post-
expiration payments were neither “deferred payments for use during the pre-
expiration period”271 nor metered royalties which would have “present[ed]
wholly different considerations.”272
As with Morton Salt, the Court was concerned that the patentee was
abusing the patent system to encumber commerce and marketplace competi-
tion through withholding from use what is in the public domain.273 This con-
cern was reiterated by the Court in Brulotte in Aronson v. Quick Pencil Co.
more than a decade later, when it stated that post-expiration royalty agree-
ments that did “not withdraw any idea from the public domain” would be
enforceable.274 Like Brulotte, the agreement in Aronson provided for royalty
payments indefinitely. Unlike Brulotte, it provided a reduced royalty figure
in the event the patent did not issue.275
Judge Callahan was not content with simply applying Brulotte to the
facts, however. She described Brulotte as a “frequently-criticized decision,”
and wrote that it was “counterintuitive and its rationale is arguably uncon-
266. Id. at 33.
267. Id. at 30.
268. Id. at 31.
269. Id. (quoting Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945)).
270. Id. at 33 (“But to use that leverage to project those royalty payments beyond the life
of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by tieing the sale
or use of the patented article to the purchase or use of unpatented ones.”); see also id. at
33–34. (“[A]fter expiration of the last of the patents incorporated in the machines, ‘the grant of
a patent monopoly was spent’ and that an attempt to project it into another term by continua-
tion of the licensing agreement is unenforceable.”).
271. Id. at 31.
272. Id. at 31-32.
273. Id. at 32-33. (“If that device were available to patentees, the free market visualized
for the post-expiration period  would be subject to monopoly influences that have no proper
place there.”).
274. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1979).
275. Id. at 259 (providing for a reduction from five percent to two and one half percent of
sales.).
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vincing.”276 The point of contention was the agreement to pay royalties on a
hybrid agreement indefinitely—”a technical detail that both parties regarded
as insignificant at the time of the agreement.”277
Judge Callahan cited Judge Posner’s opinion in Scheiber v. Dolby Labs.,
Inc., another patent misuse case, for support of her position.278 In Scheiber,
Judge Posner argued that “[f]or a licensee in accordance with a provision in
the license agreement to go on paying royalties after the patent expires does
not extend the duration of the patent either technically or practically, be-
cause . . . if the licensee agrees to continue paying royalties after the patent
expires the royalty rate will be lower.”279 He added that “[t]he duration of
the patent fixes the limit of the patentee’s power to extract royalties; it is a
detail whether he extracts them at a higher rate over a shorter period of time
or a lower rate over a longer period of time.”280 In a statement that seemed
laden with resignation, Judge Callahan “reluctantly” applied Brulotte be-
cause the Ninth Circuit was “bound by Supreme Court authority and the
strong interest in maintaining national uniformity on patent law issues.”281
Judge Callahan’s almost emotional protestations in an otherwise mea-
sured and methodical analysis are remarkable. More importantly, it invites
the question of whether the Supreme Court in Brulotte was truly misguided.
The key objection articulated in Scheiber and echoed in Kimble was that
licensees should not be allowed to wriggle their way out of a deal they had
agreed to when it became inconvenient to continue paying royalties simply
because those royalties exceeded the patent term. That objection to unfair-
ness is unfounded and misconstrues both the rule in Brulotte and the cases
that have applied it.
The Aronson Court was fully aware that the licensee was attempting to
relieve itself of a contract that encumbered it in the race against widespread
copying by competitors who did not have to pay royalties.282 Affirming Bru-
lotte, the Aronson Court stated that had the royalty rate remained fixed, it
would have limited payment to the patent term.283 It found no patent lever-
age but rather that the agreement “merely require[d] [the licensee] to pay the
consideration which it promised in return for use of the novel device which
276. Kimble v. Marvel Enters. Inc., 727 F.3d. 856, 857 (9th Cir. 2013).
277. Id. at 866.
278. Id. (citing Scheiber v. Dolby Labs. Inc., 293 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2002)).
279. Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1017 (alteration in original).
280. Id.
281. Kimble, 727 F.3d, at 857; see also Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1018 (“[W]e have no
authority to overrule a Supreme Court decision no matter how dubious its reasoning strikes us,
or even how out of touch with the Supreme Court’s current thinking the decision seems.”).
282. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 260 (1979).
283. Id. at 263-64 (stating that she would have received “a 5% royalty only on
keyholders sold during the 17–year life of the patent”).
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enabled it to pre-empt the market.”284 It reasoned that, despite “some addi-
tional bargaining power” accrued from the then-pending patent application,
the proviso for a diminished royalty rate triggered by its non-issuance re-
moved that concern.”285
Similarly, the Brulotte Court did not preclude installment payments for
machines leased or sold by the patentee that continued beyond patent
term.286 Brulotte recognized that parties were free to allocate their risks and
rewards based on metering of usage, but that the binding force of those
agreements should not come from patent leverage.287 Justice Harlan, who
alone dissented in Brulotte, pointed out that the agreement would have
passed muster if it had required installments for the sale or lease of the hop-
picking machines.288 Because licensees care only about the total value and
total price, it would have been a minor detail without economic significance.
Spreading royalties over a longer period helps the licensee defer costs
while allowing the licensor to obtain royalty revenue it might not otherwise
have if the licensee did not take the license. As John W. Schlicher explained,
the royalty reduction is reflected in the “difference between the cost and
demand during the term. . . . [T]he patent owner gains the potential to re-
strict quantity during the postexpiration period only to the extent it permits
quantity to expand in the earlier period.”289 Schlichler points out that “mar-
ket power existing during the term patent can only be exploited once. Even
if output is restricted in the post-expiration period, there is an offsetting ben-
284. Id. at 264; see also id. at 264–65 (“[T]he reduced royalty which is challenged, far
from being negotiated ‘with the leverage’ of a patent, rested on the contingency that no patent
would issue within five years.”).
285. Id. at 265 (“It is clear that whatever role the pending application played in the nego-
tiation of the 5% royalty, it played no part in the contract to pay the 21/2% royalty indefi-
nitely.”); see also id. at 266 (noting that the agreement was “freely undertaken in arm’s-length
negotiation and with no fixed reliance on a patent or probable patent grant.”).
286. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1964); see also 2 ECKSTROM’S LI-
CENSING IN FOREIGN & DOMESTIC OPERATIONS § 8E:14 (2014) (“In its decision, the Court
distinguished post-expiration royalties from a package license arrangement, voluntarily agreed
to by the parties, with a non-diminishing royalty rate that continues until the last of the li-
censed patents has expired.”).
287. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at  31-32.
288. Id. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
289. 2 JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES § 13:218
(2d ed. 2012) (“After the term, all others will be able to use the invention freely in competition
with those licensees. Unless that license provides them some additional benefit, the rate must
be lowered to induce the licensees to agree to pay over the longer period.”).
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efit in that output has been greater during the patent term.”290 Once the pat-
ent expires, the value of the license diminishes.291
One reason why courts find against post-expiration royalty agreements
is because “it is impossible for them to rewrite the agreement to determine
what the ‘right’ rate is for the know-how when the patent(s) disappear from
the picture as valid consideration.”292
In facilitating the transaction, the patent right had done its job. To lever-
age on patent remedies rather than rely on applicable remedies for breach of
contract would be precisely the sort of overreaching that patent policy
should be concerned about. In contrast, if there the patent owner could show
that it had conducted itself equitably, the post-expiration roaylties would be
upheld. Thus, the district court in Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc. did
not read Brulotte as dictating that post-expiration royalties automatically
rendered the patent unenforceable, as long there was no coercive patent
leverage.293
The arrangement served Kimble well—to the tune of six million dollars
in royalties—and became an issue only when he sought to claim royalties
over an end-product where his invention formed an increasingly small
component.
Commercialization of scientific research has progressed unimpeded by
the rule in Brulotte. Running royalties have “increased by 30% in fiscal year
2012 over 2011, to $1.9 billion.”294 Research instituions and companies have
been able to structure payments using a combination of payment terms to
290. Id. Other benefits Schlicher identified include reduction in compliance and enforce-
ment costs for a patent portfolio license with patents that expire at different times, and al-
lowing parties to allocate risks based on a subsequent invalidity ruling.  According to
Schlicher, Brulotte favors manufacturing patentees over their non-manufacturing counterparts
because the latter does not have the vehicle of a product or service to attach installment pay-
ments to. Id. While that may be true, that discrimination is an issue separate from whether
post-expiration royalties can be rendered unenforceable under patent misuse.
291. Craig J. Madson, Patent Misuse in Franchise Agreements: A Ripple on the Waters
of Franchise Law, 20 FRANCHISE L.J. 107, 109 (2001) (“When the patents expire, the value of
the agreement has diminished, and the courts will probably continue to assume that an un-
reduced royalty payment is tantamount to an unlawful extension of the patent period.”); see
also id. (“To avoid the defense of patent misuse, franchisors should build into their agreements
a method for decreasing royalties after their patents expire, and an express allocation of royal-
ties paid in consideration of patent rights and nonpatent rights.”).
292. Hoerner, supra note 63, at 705.
293. Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 310, 336-37 (D. Del. 2010)
(“[E]ven assuming that Cordance’s contractual agreements did constitute patent misuse per se
under Brulotte, it does not follow that the court need render the ’710 patent unenforceable in
its entirety. The court might invalidate only the post-expiration passive royalties. And here,
any final extension that would put the GSP Agreement beyond the term of the ’710 patent has
not yet been and might never be exercised.”).
294. Brief of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, supra note 8, at *8 (quoting As-
sociation of University Technology Managers, AUTM Licensing Activity Survey 2012 14
(2013)).
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“accommodate[ ] the licensee’s desire both to conserve its current financial
resources and shift some of the risk of failure to the licensor, which may be
especially desirable if the licensee seeks continuing assistance of the licen-
sor’s scientific staff to overcome technical hurdles during development.”295
Contrary to those concerned that Brulotte imposes an “unjustified con-
straint”296  on licenses, flexible agreements involving “transfer of biological
materials that have intrinsic value as personal property, provision of its
scientists’ know-how, or an offer of patients’ data generated through clinical
trials”297 have continued despite the rule being the law since 1964.
As a practical matter, the rule in Brulotte can be avoided by providing
for step-down royalties post-expiration and distinguishing between royalties
for patent and non-patent rights.298 Alternatively, because royalties in a trade
secret or know-how license that extend beyond the term of actual secrecy are
ordinarily permissible, inventors are free to use them rather than patents. It
would fly in the face of justice for courts to rewrite contracts simply because
parties were unaware of a rule against perpetual royalties and one party later
found it an inconvenient truth in its quest for greater financial gain. Brulotte
was therefore right in refusing to conjecture what the parties’ bargaining
position would have been and what agreement might have resulted had post-
expiration royalties been separated from the patent.
As a matter of equity, patents owners in Kimble’s position are not left
without remedy. In a separate but related case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
Kimble could pursue his breach of contract claim against Marvel on the
theory that “much like a quantum meruit plaintiff, Kimble is essentially ask-
ing to be placed in the position that he would have occupied had the Settle-
ment Agreement never been made. Like the Seventh Circuit, we do not read
Brulotte to preclude such a claim.”299
295. Id. at *6 (“Research institutions and companies generally structure payments under
these license agreements using a combination of payment terms, including: (i) a lump-sum
license issuance fee; (ii) milestone payments to be paid upon the occurrence of events during
development, e.g., the start or finish of different phases of clinical trials; (iii) annual fees for
the use of technology; and (iv) running royalties for a fixed period of time based on commer-
cial sales if the resulting product is approved by the Food and Drug Administration for use by
the public.”).
296. Id. at *18.
297. Id.
298. Tonya Gisselberg, Hybrid Licensing Agreement Unenforceable Beyond the Patent
Expiration Date, SEATTLE COPYRIGHT WATCH (July 19, 2013), http://www.seat-
tlecopyrightwatch.com/licensing/hybrid-licensing-agreement-unforceable-beyond-the-patent-
expiration-date/ (noting that the result in Kimble could have been avoided by “separating li-
cense grants by the type of intellectual property right granted and clearly identifying the roy-
alty rates and rights associated with a particular type of IP.”); see also Madson, supra note
291, at 109 (“[B]ecause courts have consistently found that single royalty payments constis-
tently found that single royalty payments constitute misuse, franchisors should clearly demar-
cate the value of the trademark, know-how, and trade secret rights from the patent rights.”).
299. Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 867 n.8 (9th Cir. 2013).
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It was unfortunate that the Brulotte Court included the words “per se.”
No antitrust violation had been alleged. Those words were not only a distrac-
tion, but they provided a convenient latch for later courts and commentators
preferring to bottle patent misuse within the antitrust decanter.300
But the point that both Scheiber and Kimble miss is this: courts that
found misuse were targeting harm caused by an abuse of the patent sys-
tem.301 The Brulotte court was applying patent misuse as conceived by the
Supreme Court in Morton Salt, and not as later reformulated by the Seventh
Circuit in USM or the Federal Circuit in Windsurfing.302 It is a matter of
detail rather than necessity that market competition, and certainly market
competition in the antitrust sense, is affected.303 The Patent Act itself me-
thodically first states those exclusive rights and immediately proceeds to
temporally circumscribe them.304 In framing its approach to patent misuse,
the Supreme Court wrote that
[t]he necessities or convenience of the patentee do not justify any
use of the monopoly of the patent to create another monopoly. The
fact that the patentee has the power to refuse a license does not
enable him to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by the expedient
of attaching conditions to its use.305
300. See, e.g., Brief of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, supra note 8, at *13
(“The demise of Brulotte would leave the task of policing anti-competitive licensing agree-
ments where it belongs: with the federal antitrust laws.”); see also Brief of the Intellectual
Property Law Association of Chicago, supra note 8, at *3-5 (arguing that Brulotte should be
reconsidered in light of changes to economic analysis of antitrust law.).
301. See Meehan v. PPG Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 1986) (“What plaintiff
fails to recognize is that Brulotte is not concerned with restrictions on the sale of patent rights
but rather the impact of such arrangements on the policies and purposes of the federal patent
laws.”).
302. See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 139 (1969)
(finding that coercive package licenses compelling licensees to pay royalties on upatented as
well as patented products, and that there were dictated by the patentee’s “patent power” rather
than “convenience of the parties,” could be patent misuse whether or not there were antitrust
violations).
303. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 3.2d (“Judge Posner’s concerns are legiti-
mate from an economic standpoint. They do not fully reflect the law today, however. In part
this is because patent misuse is not only about ‘monopolistic abuse,’ but also serves as an
internal constraint on efforts to expand the patent system beyond its bounds. One might ques-
tion whether the patent law needs such a constraint, but it seems clear that the courts intend to
apply misuse doctrine to at least some sorts of conduct antitrust law would not reach.”).
304. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the paten-
tee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention. . . .”); id. § 154(a)(2) (“[S]uch grant shall be for a term beginning on the
date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for
the patent was filed. . . .”).
305. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944); see also
Meehan, 802 F.2d at 883 (“Thus for a limited time the inventor may profit exclusively from
the invention on condition that the invention goes public after 17 years. Even this limited
monopoly right has extensive social and economic consequences for the public and therefore
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The Brulotte Court used the post-expiration date as a proxy for what would
be considered illegal extensions of the patent right, much in the same way
that the Actavis Court used the quantum of payment relative to litigation
costs as a proxy to determine an antitrust violation. Should parties wish to
allocate their rights in a more sophisticated manner, they are no more bur-
dened in splitting up those rights than copyright owners who have had to
parse out a bundle of rights—an uncontroversial proposition.306
Like Kimble, Actavis was concerned about patentees extending the pe-
riod of exclusivity beyond the term of the patent. Whether the reverse pay-
ment agreements resulted in the generic entering the market before patent
expired was probative to its assessment of whether the agreement was
outside the patent scope.307 The Actavis Court recognized that although the
Patent Act confers exclusive rights for a limited term, it does not justify
using reverse payments to do so.308 This informed the Court’s inquiry into
whether “the patent statute specifically gives a right to restrain competition
in the manner challenged,”309 and its conclusion that it did “not identify any
patent statute that it understands to grant such a right to a patentee, whether
expressly or by fair implication.”310
In Scheiber, Judge Posner conceded that his criticisms of Brulotte would
be unjustified had Brulotte relied on the Constitution or statute rather than a
“misplaced fear of monopoly.”311 His objections were economic—competi-
tion would not be affected since the restrictions placed on the licensee did
not prevent others from exploiting once-patented ideas post-expiry.312
Whether and to what extent competition is affected by the fettered licensee
requires a case-specific market inquiry. The Supreme Court denied the licen-
the courts are ever watchful of the possibility that patent monopolies will overstep their
bounds.”).
306. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
307. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (observing that parties could
settle by “allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the patentee’s market prior to the patent’s
expiration.”).
308. Id. at 2234 (“The payment in effect amounts to a purchase by the patentee of the
exclusive right to sell its product, a right it already claims but would lose if the patent litigation
were to continue and the patent were held invalid or not infringed by the generic product.”).
309. Id. at 2231 (citing United States v. Line Material, 333 U.S. 287, 310-11 (1948)).
310. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2233.
311. Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1018.
312. Harold See & Frank M. Caprio, The Trouble with Brulotte: The Patent Royalty
Term and Patent Monopoly Extension, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 813, 814 (1990) (“The Brulotte
rule incorrectly assumes that a patent license has significance after the patent terminates. When
the patent term ends, the exclusive right to make, use or sell the licensed invention also ends.
Because the invention is available to the world, the license in fact ceases to have value. Pre-
sumably, licensees know this when they enter into a licensing agreement. If the licensing
agreement calls for royalty payments beyond the patent term, the parties base those payments
on the licensees’ assessment of the value of the license during the patent period. These pay-
ments, therefore, do not represent an extension in time of the patent monopoly.”).
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sor’s petition for certiorari in Scheiber, implicitly endorsing the result in
Brulotte despite Judge Posner’s earlier criticism.313
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co, the Supreme Court noted that
patent rights awarded to encourage invention were to be balanced against the
“rights and welfare of the community,” with limitations strictly enforced.314
Thus, “when the patent expires the monopoly created by it expires” and the
right to make the article passes to the public.315 Seemingly anticipating
Scheiber’s objection, the Court presciently acknowledged that “[a]n unpat-
entable article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the pub-
lic domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so.”
Leverage was at the heart of the objection.316
C. A Pause for Thought
Actavis ushered in an age of more vigorous antitrust scrutiny of patent
rights. Even a valid and infringed patent did not give the patentee carte
blanche to do as it pleased. Antitrust law could limit the exercise of patent
rights if it harmed market competition and consumer welfare. To support its
conclusions, the Court dusted off its older decisions from the 1940s to the
1970s.317 The view that patent rights were vulnerable to antirust scrutiny was
a view accepted by courts as recently as the turn of the millennium.318 Al-
though the Actavis dissent accused the majority of “announc[ing] a new
rule,”319 this more qualified view of patents echoes the Court’s recent deci-
313. Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1016.
314. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1964).
315. Id. at 225.
316. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“What
patent misuse is about, in short, is ‘patent leverage,’ i.e., the use of the patent power to impose
overbroad conditions on the use of the patent in suit that are ‘not within the reach of the
monopoly granted by the Government.’”).
317. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965) (antitrust liability for patent-based fraud); United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S.
174 (1963) (patent-related settlement agreements can violate the antitrust laws.); United States
v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948) (improper use of patent rights circumscribed by
antitrust law); United States v.  U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) (patent rights must be
balanced against antitrust policies).
318. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The
company claims an absolute and unfettered right to use its intellectual property as it wishes:
‘[I]f intellectual property rights have been lawfully acquired,’ it says, then ‘their subsequent
exercise cannot give rise to antitrust liability.’ That is no more correct than the proposition that
use of one’s personal property, such as a baseball bat, cannot give rise to tort liability.”) (alter-
ation in original) (citation omitted); see also In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d
1322, 1325 (2000) (“Intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the anti-
trust laws.”).
319. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2239 (2013); see also id. at 2242 (“The
majority points to no case where a patent settlement was subject to antitrust scrutiny merely
because the validity of the patent was uncertain. Not one. It is remarkable, and surely worth
something, that in the 123 years since the Sherman Act was passed, we have never let antitrust
law cross that Rubicon.”).
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sion in eBay v. MercExchange, where it held that patents do not confer an
automatic right to exclude but instead needs to be considered in the context
of broader equities and concerns.320
Actavis also stood out from recent antitrust decisions favoring defend-
ants.321 The Court noted that, although “avoided litigation costs or fair value
for services” may indicate that settlements should survive a rule of reason
scrutiny, defendants may have less success with motions to dismiss going
forward.322 Settling parties may point to co-marketing arrangements as a jus-
tification for the reverse payment, but they are unlikely to win their case on
summary judgment.323 Parties on both sides will be compelled to marshal
robust economic valuations to support or oppose the challenged payments.324
However, there are also two risks involved in increased antitrust scru-
tiny—first, that patentees may be less willing to invest in new drugs, and
second, that generics may be less willing to mount patent challenges because
the likelihood of obtaining a settlement needs to be further discounted post-
Actavis.325 Even supporters of the majority’s decision must concede that it
320. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (“We hold only that
the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of
the district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional princi-
ples of equity, in patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards.”).
321. See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009) (re-
stricting the reach of Section 2 of the Sherman Act for monopolization cases involving “price-
squeezes.”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (antitrust complaint requires
enough factual matter, taken as true, to suggest that an agreement was made.).
322. See, e.g., Cooper et al., supra note 209 (“[T]he Actavis decision is a break from a
line of recent Supreme Court decisions in antitrust that have sought to reduce uncertainty and
litigation costs and to strengthen the tools available for dismissing non-meritorious suits
early.”).
323. Levin & Ayzenberg-Lyman, supra note 231 (“Because the Court’s rule of reason
analysis shifts the burden to the defendants to justify the reverse payment involved in a settle-
ment agreement, the decision makes it very difficult for defendants to prevail on a motion to
dismiss. And because discovery is time consuming and expensive, Actavis increases signifi-
cantly the costs of settling patent infringement lawsuits. In settling a patent infringement law-
suit, parties must now also consider the potential costs of discovery should their settlement
agreement be challenged under the antitrust laws. Furthermore, it also remains to be seen how
courts will apply the ‘amorphous rule’ announced in Actavis on summary judgment in terms of
the ease with which an antitrust plaintiff could create a disputed issue of fact. This uncertainty
further raises the cost of settling patent disputes.”); see also Cooper et al., supra note 209
(“Challenges to reverse payment settlements will thus seemingly be able to breeze through the
motion to dismiss stage; industry participants hoping for clarity and finality after all these
years of litigation and controversy will likely be disappointed.”).
324. Peter Todaro et al., Client Alert: Applying the Supreme Court’s Decision in Actavis,
KING & SPALDING (July 24, 2013), available at http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/
library/publication/ca072413.pdf (including “(a) employing a special master; (b) inviting the
FTC to participate in the proceedings; and (c) utilizing some other proxy or procedure de-
signed to represent the public interest.”).
325. Kevin E. Noonan, IMS Study Shows Pro-Competitive Effects of Reverse Payment
Settlement Agreements in ANDA Litigation, PATENT DOCS (July 18, 2013) http://www.
patentdocs.org/2013/07/ims-study-shows-pro-competitive-effects-of-reverse-payment-settle-
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carries its own hefty price, and without any guarantee that it will achieve its
intended results. Described by Robin Feldman as “ground zero” for pharma-
ceutical development and sales, the impact of Actavis on drug prices and
innovation—for better or worse—will be felt in the United States and far
beyond.
In short, Actavis has reactivated antitrust scrutiny of patent rights.
Courts will see more antitrust challenges within the Hatch-Waxman context
and with patent matters more generally. This will in turn generate more de-
bate about how innovation and competition policies are balanced in the exer-
cise of patent rights. In time, this debate will spill-over to patent misuse. The
defense lies at crossroads of patent and antitrust law, and a revitalization of
antitrust scrutiny should cause more misuse cases, such as those in Kimble,
to be brought as well.
No one is immune to a change of heart. In 2003, Judge Posner became
an unlikely advocate of misuse. In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex
Corp., he concluded it would be a “travesty of equity” to permit the plaintiff
an extension of its patent beyond the patent term.326 In so doing, he acknowl-
edged that was effectively reaching the same result as if he had found misuse
and refused to enforce the patent against Apotex because it had already ex-
pired.327 If one of the Chicago School’s best-known personalities is prepared
to look beyond antitrust policy and invoke its equitable basis, a new dawn
may yet come to those hoping for a measured revitalization of patent misuse.
While one judge interviewed emphasized that there was no judicial hos-
tility toward misuse, it was difficult for him to “sense vigor beyond antitrust
case law.”328 Litigants have added that “[n]or is there any reason to expand
the misuse defense to reach alleged collateral anticompetitive conduct, when
the antitrust laws already provide any party that suffers competitive injury
ment-agreements-in-anda-litigation.html (“[S]ettlements of ANDA litigation in 33 different
drug molecules resulted in a savings to consumers of $25.5 billion from 2005-2012, and are
projected to provide an additional $61.7 billion through patent expiry for patents listed in the
Orange Book for these drugs.  About one third ($8.3 billion) of the 2005-2012 total were
savings to the Federal government.”).
326. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1045-47 (N.D.
Ill. 2003).
327. Id. at 1046 (“Another way to explain SmithKline’s disentitlement to an injunction is
in terms of the doctrine, classically equitable—an aspect of the historic doctrine of ‘unclean
hands’—of patent misuse.”).
328. LIM, supra note 11, at 385 (“The important point that I want to be clear about—if
people assume that judges on this court or any court are hostile to the patent misuse defense, I
think that’s quite wrong. If people assume that judges on the court are just dying to expand it
greatly, I think that’s also wrong. . . . Given the right facts and the right evidence, we might be
expected to reverse a finding of no misuse or to affirm a finding of misuse where that’s made
in a strong, clear case. I don’t think the doctrine is dead or totally redundant of antitrust case
law. But, on the other hand, it’s hard to have any sense of how much vigor it might have,
beyond antitrust case law.”).
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with powerful means of redress.”329 Other interviewees noted that patent
misuse should not become a free-floating ‘get out of jail free’ card.330 In
light of these concerns, the first step to any revitalization of patent misuse
must be to answer these and other key concerns.
V. ANSWERING THE CRITICS
Criticisms of patent misuse doctrine center on three areas.331 First, crit-
ics argue that the vagueness of misuse detracts from commercial certainty
needed by businesses and innovators. Misuse should not become “an open-
ended pitfall for patent-supported commerce.”332 Second, they oppose lax
standing requirements that allow those unharmed by the patentee’s miscon-
duct to invoke the aid of courts to render the patent unenforceable. Third,
they believe that unenforceability of an entire patent due to an offending
claim or related patents due to an offending patent is too harsh of a conse-
quence for a finding of misuse. These concerns are addressed below.
A. “An Open-Ended Pitfall for Commerce”
Operationalizing policy goals can be difficult. One judge interviewed
explained that patent policy was a vague navigational tool for judicial deci-
sion making.333 He said that judges were aware of policies as they were
articulated in case law and statutes, but that the work of a judge is to imple-
ment policy and not to sit as patent policy reformer, since to do so would
infuse too much subjectivity into the process.334
As William Ridgway noted, the discretionary nature of misuse “essen-
tially invites judges to implement their own, often idiosyncratic, appraisal of
the intellectual property system.”335 According to Ridgway, this results in “a
jumbled mix of platitudes and reprimands” and “encourages critics to attack
329. Brief for Intervenor U.S. Philips Corporation on Rehearing En Banc, Princo Corp.
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2007-1386).
330. LIM, supra note 11, at 156.
331. See id. at 155-201.
332. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also
Joseph P. Bauer, Refusals to Deal with Competitors by Owners of Patents and Copyrights:
Reflections on the Image Technical and Xerox Decisions, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1211, 1235
(2006).
333. LIM, supra note 11, at 158 n.12.
334. Id. at 158 n.13 (“I’m supposed to implement the policies that are handed to me in
authority, whether it’s amendment to the statute or case-law development. I have to follow
precedent. I have to follow authority. I don’t really consider myself much of a patent poli-
cymaker. So I’m wary of an approach that talks about ‘Well, we’ve got to make the case law
conform to good, coherent patent policies,’ because a hundred people in a room would have a
hundred different views of what good, coherent patent policy is. What kind of a guide is that?
It’s way too subjective, way too indefinite, in a lot of instances.”).
335. William E. Ridgeway, Revitalizing the Doctrine of Trademark Misuse, 21 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 1547, 1566 (2006).
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the doctrine for lacking coherence and predictability, which, they charge,
ultimately undermines the value of intellectual property rights.”336
And some courts agree. Recently in Control Components, Inc. v.
Lexmark International, Inc, a district court was faced with the novel ques-
tion of whether patentees whose patents covered single-use toner cartridges
could restrict the use of any given cartridge after the exhaustion of its patent
rights in that cartridge, even without licensing agreements containing post-
sale reuse restrictions.337 The court observed that “[t]he Supreme Court has
never addressed a situation like this”,338 and, without adequate guidance on
how to proceed, it found that there was no anticompetitive effect of the kind
required under Windsurfing. The court could not find misuse as a “matter of
law,” even though it agreed that Lexmark was “doing something ‘wrong’ in
a vague sense.”339
Patentees face a similar challenge staying on the right side of the law.
Roger Arar argued that operationalizing policy through patent misuse creates
“an undesirable in terrorem effect” because patentees have to assess their
conduct or licensing agreements for their potential for subverting “ill-de-
fined policy.”340 As an alternative, Judge Posner and other advocates of an
antitrust-based form of misuse point to the more precise, economics-in-
formed framework it offers.341 Its advocates argue that the antitrust rule of
reason analysis is supple enough to take into consideration innovation policy
concerns.342 The countervailing view—that the vagueness inherent in patent
misuse is both justified and administrable—may be presented in two parts.
1. The Surprising Benefits of Vagueness
A number of interviewees, notably judges, observed that they had no
problems with the inherent vagueness of patent misuse. One judge noted that
there was no way that case law or statutes could cover every factual situation
336. Id.
337. Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 830, 854
(E.D. Ky. 2007).
338. Id.; see also Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77, 84 (6th
Cir. 1971).
339. Lexmark Int’l, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 854-55.
340. Arar, supra note 12, at 1310-11.
341. See Robert P. Merges, Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse,
70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 793, 795 (1988) (pointing out that “antitrust has evolved
a ‘precise’ methodology for ascertaining when improper market leverage is being used by a
patentee,” and that “the relatively imprecise ‘equitable’ doctrine of misuse only adds confusion
and uncertainty to the scene.”).
342. See Note, supra note 80, at 1922. According to Professor Feldman, advocates of an
antitrust-centered misuse defense point to “a larger and more fully developed body of law than
patent misuse” in their argument that “[a]pplying antitrust rules could provide greater clarity in
patent misuse doctrine and eliminate a source of confusion at the intersection of patent and
antitrust law.” Feldman, supra note 104, at 400.
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where there might be abuse.343 As another judge emphatically put it, it was
an empirical question whether the vagueness has impaired the rights of pat-
entees, and the burden was on those making the claim to prove it.344 Mar-
shall Leaffer wrote that “[o]f course equitable doctrines, like patent misuse,
are messy by their very nature. However, they do allow for a needed flexibil-
ity for judicial determination.”345
A survey of patent law reveals that judges routinely deal with doctrines
that are at least as murky as patent misuse. In the Federal Circuit’s en banc
decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., concerning ineq-
uitable conduct, Judge Kathleen O’Malley noted in her concurrence that
“clear guidelines,” although practical, are sometimes inappropriate “when
dealing with the application of equitable principles and remedies [where] the
law is imprecise by design.”346 In achieving the right balance, Supreme
Court precedent is clear that it is the flexibility to “mold each decree to the
necessities of the particular case” that allows equity which provides the fine-
tuning to the broad brush of legislation and governmental policy.347
Another example is a favorite in the patentee’s arsenal—the doctrine of
equivalents. It seems no easier to determine the existence of non-literal in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents than whether the limitations on
the doctrine of equivalents apply. One such limitation is prosecution history
estoppel, where a patentee who had previously allowed the narrowing of his
claim could nonetheless succeed in ensnaring the accused product within its
claims.348
343. LIM, supra note 11, at 160 n.26 (“Q: Does it bother you, though, that the doctrine is
as vague as it is, and even if it comes before the court, it’s hard, really, for the court to get a
handle on defining with certainty where the boundaries of the doctrine lie, how it should be
applied? A: No. Because it’s meant to cover unusual, egregious situations, which can’t be
defined in advance. It’s necessarily vague. I’m not bothered by its vagueness because it’s
unavoidably vague. I don’t see any way it could be made more specific.”).
344. Id. at 161 n.26 (“The question, though, I think, is an empirical question. Unless he
can show me data where it has actually impaired patentees, then he’s simply making an intui-
tive judgment about whether that’s true or not.”).
345. Leaffer, supra, note 52, at 157.
346. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1296 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc) (O’Malley, J., concurring) (“Patent practitioners regularly call on this court to
provide clear guidelines. They seek to know under precisely what circumstances governing
principles will be applied, and precisely how they will be applied. While precision may be in
the nature of what patent practitioners do, and the desire for defining rules in the scientific
world understandable, the law does not always lend itself to such precision.”).
347. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (citations
omitted).
348. Prosecution history estoppel requires that the claims of a patent be interpreted in
light of the proceedings in the PTO during the application process. Schriber-Schroth Co. v.
Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 220-21 (1940) (explaining that estoppel is a “rule of patent
construction” that ensures that claims are interpreted by reference to those “that have been
cancelled or rejected.”).
366 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 20:299
In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., the Su-
preme Court acknowledged the Federal Circuit’s concern over uncertainty
but went on to observe that “[e]ach time the Court has considered the doc-
trine, it has acknowledged this uncertainty as the price of ensuring the appro-
priate incentives for innovation, and it has affirmed the doctrine over
dissents that urged a more certain rule.”349 Presaging Actavis, the Court
wrote that the right balance between the two was struck by placing the bur-
den on the patentee to show that the previously-surrendered patent scope
was unforeseeable at the time of application.350
The Actavis Court also recognized the merit of burden shifting in reduc-
ing uncertainty when it effectively shifted the burden to the settling parties if
the value of the settlement exceeded expected litigation costs.351 Large and
unexplained payments could be used as a proxy for market power and an-
ticompetitive harm, sparing lower courts the need for complex, costly and
time-consuming inquiries into issues of patent validity and infringement.352
The settling parties nonetheless have the opportunity to exculpate them-
selves with a reasonable explaination of the terms of their settlement.
Recently, the Supreme Court again underscored this point in Medtronic,
Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC.353 In a unanimous opinion, the Court
reversed the Federal Circuit and held that patentees have the burden of prov-
ing infringement even in declaratory judgment actions by licensees.354 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that “[a] patent holder is in a better
position than an alleged infringer to know, and to be able to point out, just
where, how, and why a product (or process) infringes a claim of that patent.
Until he does so, however, the alleged infringer may have to work in the
dark, seeking, in his declaratory judgment complaint, to negate every con-
ceivable infringement theory.”355
In the same way, could some of the sting from patent misuse’s open-
endedness be mitigated by placing a burden on the defendant? One approach
is to require the patent defendant to show cognizable harm either to the com-
petitive process or to incentives to innovation under the general analysis that
animates patent law cases. Once defendants successfully do this, Leaffer
349. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002).
350. See id. at 740.
351. See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (“An unexplained large
reverse payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the
patent’s survival . . . provid[ing] a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without
forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.”).
352. See Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 17-18 (“In these cases, the size of the settlement
payment is undoubtedly a more reliable indicator of the parties’ own assessment of likely
litigation outcomes than is any conclusion that can be drawn from the fact of settlement
itself.”).
353. 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014).
354. Id. at 846.
355. Id. at 850.
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proposes that “the burden should shift to the patent owner to demonstrate a
business justification for having insisted on the restrictive licensing practice,
or as the case may be, a strategic use of the patent grant exceeding its scope
and contrary to patent policy.”356
This burden shifting makes sense. The party best able to produce infor-
mation to explain the situation to the court should be made to bear the bur-
den. Sometimes it will be the defendant. Other times, it will be the patentee.
If a licensing clause appears onerous on its face, or if a lawsuit by the paten-
tee appears vexatious, patentees should be made to explain why they none-
theless have good reason to prevail.
Another important reason for some vagueness in the patent misuse doc-
trine lies in its equitable roots.357 The Morton Salt Court noted that “[e]quity
may rightly withhold its assistance from such a use of the patent by declin-
ing to entertain a suit for infringement.”358 The Court’s use of the word
“rightly” suggests that patent misuse doctrine is guided by more than sterile
economic analysis. But that invites the jurisprudential question of why the
law should concern itself with barring patentees from “wrongful” gains, un-
less there is also some measure of what is “rightful”? Yet equity is an emo-
tive and almost spiritual concept.
The lack of sharply defined boundaries may deter those with a penchant
for rationality or commercial certainty from buying into reinvigorating pat-
ent misuse as a robust defense. Reluctance to rely on equity may reflect a
post-Enligtenment preference for rationality rather than a more visceral
sense of right or wrong.359 The English jurist Lord Alfred Denning suggests
an answer. He starts with the premise that legal positivism cannot be an end
in itself:
The judge says with calm detachment that the law is an end in itself.
They regard law as a series of commands issued by a sovereign
telling the people what to do or what not to do: they regard it as a
piece of social engineering designed to keep the community in good
order. Lawyers with this cast of thought draw a clear and absolute
356. Leaffer, supra note 52, at 159.
357. See Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted) (“The doctrine of ‘unclean hands’—colorfully named, equitable in origin, and reflect-
ing, in its name at least, the moralistic background of equity in the decrees of the clerics who
filled the office of lord chancellor of England during the middle ages, nowadays just means
that equitable relief will be refused if it would give the plaintiff a wrongful gain.”).
358. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942) (emphasis added).
359. But see POSNER, supra note 22, at 110 (“At every stage the judge’s reasoning pro-
cess is primarily intuitive. Given the constraints of time, it could not be otherwise; for intuition
is a great economizer on conscious attention. The role of the unconscious judge in judicial
decision making is obscured by the convention that requires a judge to explain his decision in
an opinion. The judicial opinion can best be understood as an attempt to explain how the
decision, even if (as is most likely) arrived at on the basis of intuition, could have been arrived
at on the basis of logical, step-by-step reasoning.”).
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line between law and morals, or what is nearly the same thing, be-
tween law and justice. Judges and advocates are, to their minds, not
concerned with the morality or justice of the law but only with the
interpretation of it and its enforcement.
That is a great mistake. It overlooks the reason why people obey the
law. . . . People will respect rules which are intrinsically right and
just and will expect their neighbours to obey them, as well as obey
the rules themselves: but they will not feel the same about rules
which are unrighteous or unjust.360
What is “unrighteous or unjust” appears starker to the observer in cases in-
volving criminal law matters. The loss of life or liberty is more viscerally
felt than infringement of an abstract right framed by obtuse technical jargon.
Yet justice remains the overarching goal in the outcome of each case.361
Courts desiring to reclaim the heart of equity in patent misuse cases
should require fair play.362 Equity looks beyond the form of a misuse to its
effects. A judge interviewed noted that patent misuse plays a valuable role
because it “appeals to our sense of right and wrong,” and exists to arrest
misconduct not made illegal under existing laws “even at the cost of more
vagueness in the doctrine.”363 Patent misuse thus serves as an insurance pol-
icy against unanticipated roguish behavior from patentees. The ingenuity of
patentees to devise ways of abusing their patent rights is matched only by
the potential malleability of patent misuse. Though rare, when courts found
patentees acted in bad faith, the result was decisively in the defendants’
favor.364
360. ALFRED DENNING, THE ROAD TO JUSTICE 2–3 (1955).
361. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012) (Federal judges pledge to administer justice “without re-
spect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and
impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent . . . under the Constitution and laws
of the United States.”); The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, SUP. CT. U.S., http://
www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2014). (“‘EQUAL JUS-
TICE UNDER LAW’—These words, written above the main entrance to the Supreme Court
Building, express the ultimate responsibility of the Supreme Court of the United States. . . . As
the final arbiter of the law, the Court is charged with ensuring the American people the prom-
ise of equal justice under law. . . .”).
362. See LIM, supra note 11, at 168, n.62 (“There are aspects of the patent arena that are
such that a government-granted right to exclude might be a powerful enough tool that it war-
rants somewhat broader control by the courts, since the capacity of people to come up with
ways to misuse things is probably endless and extends to the limits of the creativity of man.
The principles of equity that originally gave rise to the patent misuse doctrine probably war-
ranted being given a little greater flexibility, even at the cost of more vagueness in the
doctrine.”).
363. Id. at 423 (“[B]ad faith played a decisive role in patent misuse litigation. . . .
[W]here the court made a finding that a patentee displayed bad faith, the outcome was in the
defendant’s favor.”).
364. See, e.g., Koratron Co. v. Lion Unif., Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (holding that “[t]he patentee must itself maintain high standards of conduct and candor
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Patent misuse may find its second wind in the wake of controversial
practices by patent assertion entities (PAEs) such as Innovatio IP Ventures,
who sued customers to “hold-up” manufacturers providing devices comply-
ing with the Wi-Fi standard.365 Another prominent PAE is Intellectual Ven-
tures, which was recently accused of targeting the market for “technology-
enabling business processes common throughout the commercial banking
industry in the United States.”366
The defendant, Capital One, accused Intellectual Ventures of patent mis-
use and antitrust violations for using 2,000 shell companies owning 80,000
patents of dubious quality to force companies into settling patent infringe-
ment lawsuits at inflated royalties.367 The district court dismissed Capital
One’s claims on dubious grounds. As an initial matter, the court cited Ac-
tavis as explaining patent misuse.368 Actavis did not even mention, much less
explain misuse. Second, the kind of privateering conduct that PAEs such as
Intellectual Ventures undertake on behalf of their sponsors has been empiri-
cally found not to promote innovation.369 This over-reaching through an
abuse of the patent system is arguably the sort of conduct that Justice Stone
if it is to use its patent properly.” and failing to do so meant that it was barred from enforcing
its patent.); see also Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., No. 78-485-S, 1981 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9432, at *29 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 1981) (finding that the threatened litigation gave rise
to a finding of bad faith, particularly in light of other exclusionary activities including contrac-
tual interference, a preferential discounting scheme and tie-in agreements).
365. See Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 7 n.21. (July
2, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/pae.
pdf (“This tactic can also take the form of nuisance suits filed against customers, which also
can lead to an outsize threat.  A prominent recent example of a PAE employing this tactic is
Innovatio IP Ventures, which has reportedly send some 8,000 demand letters to commercial
users of WiFi, such as restaurants, coffee shops, and hotels, for infringing WiFi SEPs Innova-
tio purchased from Broadcom.”).
366. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-CV-00740 (AJT/
TRJ), 2013 WL 6682981 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013).
367. Id. at *1; see also id. at *11 (“[I]ts patent misuse defense, like its antitrust claims,
essentially rests on its allegation that IV credibly threatens to enforce, in piecemeal fashion,
“thousands of patents in a never-ending series of costly and disruptive patent infringement law
suits.”).
368. Id. at *10 (citing F.T.C v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2231) (“[Patent misuse] has
been explained by the Federal Circuit or the U.S. Supreme Court.”).
369. See Morton & Shapiro, supra note 365 (“Transferring funds using a very leaky
bucket is only beneficial if the marginal impact of greater funds on innovation is far larger for
those receiving the funds (here, patentees) than for those providing the funds (here, down-
stream firms). However, we have seen no evidence indicating that the R&D investments by
patentees are far more responsive to future royalty income received via PAEs than the R&D
investments made by downstream firms are to the costs PAE impose upon them.  Nor have we
seen evidence indicating that the investments undertaken by patentees whose patents are later
sold to PAEs are far more beneficial to consumers than are the investments undertaken by the
firms targeted by those PAEs.”). For a discussion of patent misuse in the context of standard
essential patents, see Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents: Triangulating the End Game,
119 PENN ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author) (analyzing the Intellectual
Ventures case in the context of patent misuse).
370 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 20:299
was concerned about in Morton Salt. Similarly, owners of standard essential
patents who transfer their portfolios to PAEs in order to avoid licensing
commitments should also expect to face sanctions under patent or antitrust
law,370 including patent misuse.
2. Is Antitrust Really Less Vague?
The prevailing zeitgeist favors certainty. Until the Supreme Court de-
cides to speak further on misuse, Windsurfing will remain the controlling
precedent on the law of misuse in the lower courts. The Federal Circuit
should explain why Windsurfing’s formulation makes sense and how its an-
titrust scaffold will provide better guidance to stakeholders,
Antitrust law has moved in recent years from a per se to a rule of reason
analysis.371 But Chief Justice Roberts in Actavis warned that antitrust law’s
rule of reason was “amorphous”, going so far as to write “[g]ood luck to the
district courts that must, when faced with a patent settlement, weigh the
‘likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and poten-
tially offsetting legal considerations present in the circumstances.’”372
Alan Greenspan suggests that one reason for the vagueness of antitrust
law stems from the economics underpinning it. Commenting on the state of
antitrust policy in the 1960s, he observed that “[t]he entire structure of anti-
trust statutes in this country is a jumble of economic irrationality and igno-
rance. It is the product of (a) a gross interpretation of history, and (b) of
rather naı̈ve, and certainly unrealistic, economic theories.”373 This observa-
tion may have arisen because, although the articulated goal of modern anti-
trust is the promotion of market efficiency, the antitrust laws were used for
socio-political goals such as promoting small business interests.374
Another reason for that vagueness is the lack of statutory guidance. One
judge interviewed noted that, whereas patent law was bound more strictly by
detailed statutory provisions, antitrust law gave judges more room to maneu-
ver because antitrust legislation was extremely vague and terse.375 Antitrust
370. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable
Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1159 (2013) (“Just as
a mendacious patentee can’t whitewash inequitable conduct by selling the patent to someone
who didn’t lie to the patent office, a patentee that has promised that a patent will not be
enforced by means of an injunction can’t wipe away that commitment by finding a buyer who
didn’t make that promise.”).
371. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)
(overruling per se approach to price restraints); see also Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling per se approach to non-price restraints).
372. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2245 (2013).
373. Alan Greenspan, Antitrust, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 57, 63 (Signet
1986).
374. See Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 49, at 906.
375. LIM, supra note 11, at 171 n.75 (“The antitrust field developed very differently.
Over the decades, judges made all sorts of antitrust law— just made it up out of nowhere. The
Robinson-Patman Act, the Clayton Act, the Sherman Act are extremely vague, extremely
Spring 2014] Patent Misuse and Antitrust 371
statutes are vague because “Congress apparently did not want to get in-
volved in articulating a specific definition of competition or in determining
which practices might promote or undermine it. Rather it enacted a few gen-
eral principles derived from the common law, and left it largely to the courts
to determine what practices violate them.”376
Commenting on the rule of reason, Merges observed that: “[n]ot only is
[it] a notoriously difficult standard for an antitrust plaintiff to meet, it is also
a standard that is very difficult to apply. Thus, it is ironic that advocates of
greater certainty in the law of patent misuse would propose a unified rule of
reason approach when this is arguably one of the least certain legal rules
ever propounded.”377 Congress twice considered and rejected revisions to a
patent misuse law that would have required a successful showing of an anti-
trust violation, despite the law’s proponents arguing that antitrust law pro-
vided greater certainty.378
The tributaries of antitrust law are carved out and filled in by the ideolo-
gies flowing from the wellspring deep within the recesses of the judge’s own
views of patents, economic monopolies, and market competition in gen-
eral.379 Although people generally agree that a competitive market structure
terse. The courts just made it up. . . . Patent law hasn’t developed in that kind of freewheeling
way, where the law is basically being written, not by the Congress, but by appellate judges.
The patent law has been, in my view, a little more modest— a lot more modest. It has tried to
carefully follow the policies that are discernibly embedded in the statute and in amendments to
the statute and, of course, in Supreme Court authority, which, of course, we have to follow and
we do follow.”).
376. Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 49, at 920 (footnote omitted).
377. See Merges, supra note 341, at 794 (citation omitted).
378. See The Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, § 201(a), 102
Stat. 4676 (patent ownership is not presumptive of market power); S. 1200, 100th Cong.
(1987) (“[N]o patent owner . . . shall be . . . deemed guilty of misuse . . . unless such prac-
tices . . . violate the antitrust laws”); Merges, supra note 341, at 793 (S. 1200 tests “all alleged
patent misuse offenses under antitrust standards”); see also Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Mis-
use and Antitrust Reform: “Blessed Be the Tie?”, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 25–26 (1991) (“It is
equally clear that the House rejected any suggestion of a ‘rule of reason’ analysis in patent
misuse determinations. Representative Fish explained that in response to concerns raised about
the breadth of the original Senate bill, the amended version of S. 438 eliminated the detrebling
provisions and does not require ‘the application of the rule of reason to intellectual property
arrangements.’ Even the stronger Senate provision rejected by the House would have pre-
served the per se rule once market power was shown, avoiding consideration of the tying
arrangement under the rule of reason. Furthermore, permitting business justification defenses
would eliminate any cogent distinction between the ‘threshold’ market power requirement in-
serted by the House and the ‘antitrust’ standard for misuse which the House rejected.”) (foot-
notes omitted).
379. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Settlements: The Culture of
Consent, in 1 WILLIAM E. KOVACIC: AN ANTITRUST TRIBUTE LIBER AMICORUM 181 (Nicolas
Charbit ed. 2012)  (“[T]he goals of antitrust law . . . have been subject to notoriously broad and
changing interpretations, more so than any other body of law. Although it is now generally
understood that the sole appropriate goal of antitrust law enforcement is to enhance consumer
welfare, that goal can be (and in our view should be) understood narrowly to justify only
remedial steps that clearly thwart efforts to restrict competition. The antitrust laws are still,
372 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 20:299
fosters competition in product markets, “[t]here is not yet a universally ac-
cepted consensus as to the kind of market structure that best facilitates
innovation.”380
Those favoring visible competition from rivals advocate antitrust inter-
vention to dilute the patentees’ influence on the relevant market, whereas
those who favor protecting the incentives of patentees resist the incursion of
antitrust law’s reliance on the market and internal regulation to correct any
imbalances. Modern antitrust may be grounded in economic theory, but the
chain of succession from the Harvard to Chicago to post-Chicago Schools of
antitrust over the years nonetheless makes the assertion that antitrust pro-
vides a clearer and more stable vehicle than misuse suspect. Similarly, those
advocating the Windsurfing formulation of misuse will find themselves deal-
ing with an equally amorphous framework.
3. An Identity Crisis
The main reason why patent misuse is difficult to define and operation-
alize may be what Hovenkamp and Bohannan refer to as its “identity cri-
sis.”381 They note that this identity crisis stems from a lack of a “coherent
basis in IP policy” because misuse “lacks unifying principles for determin-
ing which practices should be condemned and why.”382 Those principles,
they suggest, should be concerned about safeguarding against “unreasonable
foreclosure of competition, innovation, or access to the public domain.”383
Once the defendant has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the patentee to show “good reason for the challenged practice and the
absence of less restrictive alternatives.”384 The remedy, they conclude,
should be “tailored to the wrong,” with the court opting to find unenforce-
ability when foreclosure has happened or is likely—or, when foreclosure is
less likely, to refrain from making an order of unenforceability and also to
simply refuse to invalidate a particular license or infringement action.385
In other words, misuse is concerned with patent abuses that both impair
competition as well as those endogenous to patent policy discussed in Part II
however, understood by some enforcement agencies, as reflected in the cases discussed above
and epitomized in the Appendix to this article, to include a variety of other interventions that
are not relevant to enhancing competition, or that may even tend to frustrate it, notwithstand-
ing their appearance of aiding consumers.”).
380. Ronald W. Davis, Innovation Markets and Merger Enforcement: Current Practice
in Perspective, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 677, 681 (2003) (footnote omitted).
381. HOVENKAMP & BOHANNAN, supra note 81, at 258 (“Unfortunately, IP misuse doc-
trine is suffering from an identity crisis.”).
382. 6A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8.01 (2013), avaiable at LexisNexis
(observing that predictability of misuse is hindered because “courts have failed to adopt a
general theory as to the proper limitations on the exploitation of the patent monopoly.”).
383. HOVENKAMP & BOHANNAN, supra note 81, at 288.
384. Id. at 289.
385. See id. at 288-89.
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of the Article. That patent policy-focus can be seen as a counterbalance to
pro-patent doctrines such as the doctrine of equivalents. And, as the earlier
discussion in this Section shows, once the defendant has demonstrated harm
to competition or the integrity of the patent system, the burden should shift
to the patentee to show why its conduct is nonetheless justified.
In light of the criticism over antitrust law’s rule of reason, any proposal
incorporating a balancing test seems counterintuitive. Bruce Abramson con-
curs that “[t]he very nature of a balancing test creates uncertainty,” but that
over time cases will provide market participants with “data with which to
gauge the propriety or impropriety of their behavior.”386 While the same
might be said about the antitrust law’s rule of reason,387 the point remains
that misuse need not be less certain and is capable of the same growth pat-
tern as antitrust law in offering more guidance as long as courts remain com-
mitted to its development.
B. Disarming “Private Attorney Generals”
The second criticism of patent misuse, and one raised by Judge Posner
in Scheiber, is that individuals can act as “private attorney generals,” invok-
ing misuse where they have not been harmed by any misconduct.388 Com-
mentators criticize misuse’s apparently lax standing requirement as giving
rise to “fishing expeditions” and encouraging infringement.389 Others go fur-
ther, arguing that misuse “pays the sanction as a windfall to an unrelated
third party, thereby encouraging infringement while failing to compensate
those actually injured.”390
386. See BRUCE D. ABRAMSON, THE SECRET CIRCUIT: THE LITTLE-KNOWN COURT
WHERE THE RULES OF THE INFORMATION AGE UNFOLD 311 (2007).
387. The Supreme Court acknowledged as much in Leegin Creative Leather Products,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., where it noted that the uncertainties associated with an antitrust rule of
reason analysis could also be made more certain through future case law. See, e.g., Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898-99 (2007) (“As courts gain
experience considering the effects of these restraints by applying the rule of reason over the
course of decisions, they can establish the litigation structure to ensure the rule operates to
eliminate anticompetitive restraints from the market and to provide more guidance to busi-
nesses. Courts can, for example, devise rules over time for offering proof, or even presump-
tions where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit
anticompetitive restraints and to promote procompetitive ones.”).
388. Scheiber v. Dolby Labs. Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Dolby is in
effect a private attorney general, charged by Brulotte with preventing Scheiber from seeking to
‘extend’ his patent and being rewarded for this service to the law by getting out of a freely
negotiated royalty obligation.”).
389. See Cotter, supra note 114, at 963.
390. Lemley, supra note 105, at 1600; see also Madson, supra note 291, at 108 (“Conse-
quently, if the defendant franchisee can show that the patentee franchisor misused patent A in
any agreement, the patentee franchisor may not enforce his or her rights under patent A, in-
cluding any agreements licensing rights to patent A that do not contain provisions of patent
misuse. Therefore, patent misuse has a potentially broad reach and may render provisions in
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Such concerns have led opponents of misuse to argue that its standing
requirements should be circumscribed.391 One judge when interviewed was
concerned that “misuse was the only area in patent law where the patentee
loses all possibility of redress against the infringer because he or she may
have harmed some third party with no relation to the underlying suit.”392
However, this Section shows that such concerns are refuted by both empiri-
cal data and case law.
1. Empirical Observations
One attorney interviewed remarked that he had not “seen patent misuse
really raised except in conjunction with the infringed patent, and [that] the
courts have been fairly skeptical of standing rights to raise arguments, unless
they are directly affected by the conduct at issue.”393 Empirical data supports
this observation. Defendants invoking misuse were mostly either competi-
tors, licensees, or both. Forty-two percent were competitors and forty seven
percent were licensees (see Figure 14 below). Only in two percent of the
cases was the defendant an unrelated third party, and misuse was not found
in these cases (see Figure 15 below).
many licensing agreements unenforceable, or entire agreements unenforceable, until the mis-
use is purged.”) (footnote omitted).
391. See Katherine E. White, A Rule for Determining When Patent Misuse Should be
Applied, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 671, 679 n.56 (2001) (“Patent misuse
is a doctrine that could benefit from having a standing requirement that the misuse must di-
rectly affect the party raising the affirmative defense. Historically, there has been no standing
requirement. . . .”) (citation omitted).
392. LIM, supra note 11, at 185.
393. Id. at 186-87.
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FIGURE 14. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT
(1953 – 2013)
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FIGURE 15. RELATIONSHIPS AND OUTCOMES (1953 – 2013)
For example, in Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, the patentee Senza-Gel
sued Goehring Meat for patent infringement over a process for producing
whole boneless hams.394 OHI, Inc. was included as co-defendant because it
supplied Goehring Meat with a machine using that process. John Seiffhart
was an employee of Goehring Meat, and he was named as a defendant be-
cause the company used the machine at his suggestion. The Federal Circuit
found that Senzal-Gel tied its process patent with a staple article, but held
“that there can be no tie until a lessee uses the machine and performs the
process; there can be no tie because its process and machine patents are
‘blocking’ and can therefore be legally ‘leased’ together.”395
As will be seen below, case law from patent misuse and other areas
teach that evidence of direct harm to the complainant appearing the court is a
secondary factor in determining the issue of standing. They serve a more
important role—a bugler alerting the court to wrongdoing so that the public
interest may be protected.
394. Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 672 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
395. Id. at 668.
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2. Protecting the Public Interest
From the earliest days, the Supreme Court favored the promotion of the
public interest over the private fortunes of those involved on both sides of
the infringement suit.396 It is not to some unidentifiable class of busybodies
that patent misuse extends a flirtatious hand, inviting mischief. Rather, like
the unclean hands doctrine it is, as the Tenth Circuit put it:
[B]ased upon conscience and good faith, and is confined to miscon-
duct in relation to or in all events connected with the matter in liti-
gation so that it in some manner affects the equitable relations of the
parties to the suit. It does not extend to misconduct which is uncon-
nected with the matter in litigation, and with which the party who
asserts the maxim as a defense to his wrong has no concern.397
This policy rationale prompted the district court in Petersen v. Fee Interna-
tional, Ltd., to find that “[i]t is not material that Plaintiffs were not a party to
any of the various agreements and assignments. . . . In their ‘ball of wax’ is
patent misuse with an adverse effect upon the public which disqualifies De-
fendants from claiming infringement of [the patent].”398
In Multimedia Patent Trust v. Apple Inc., a recent case involving stan-
dard-setting organizations, the district court denied the patentee’s motion for
summary judgment, accepting misuse as a plausible defense against in-
fringement claims by a holder of a standard essential patent.399 Although the
defendants were neither licensees nor competitors, the court implicitly ac-
cepted that misconduct in the standards-setting process warranted further
scrutiny, pointing to the use of misuse as a type of system integrity check to
396. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encour-
agement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of the authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days
devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services ren-
dered.”); see also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519
(1917) (refusing to enforce the patent against contributory infringers because “it would be
gravely injurious to [the] public interest,” which it deemed “more a favorite of the law than is
the promotion of private fortunes”).
397. McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 395 F.2d 230, 238 (10th Cir. 1968).
398. Petersen v. Fee Int’l, Ltd., 381 F. Supp. 1071, 1081 (W.D. Okla. 1974).
399. Multimedia Patent Trust v. Apple Inc., No. 10–CV–2618–H (KSC), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 167479, at *80 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012). The Court found that the defendants, Apple
and LG, presented plausible evidence that the patentee’s “predecessors-in-interest were mem-
bers of the standards setting bodies . . . [and] . . . promised these standards bodies that they
would license the patents-in-suit on RAND terms, and that MPT’s damages request might
violate its RAND obligations.” Id. For a discussion of patent misuse in the context of standard
essential patents, see generally Lim, supra note 369, at 17 (describing standard essential pat-
ents as those which implementers of technology standards necessarily infringe if used without
permission).
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ensure that the mechanism Congress had put in place to promote innovation
and competition is not compromised.400
In Compton v. Metal Products, Inc., the license over a method of manu-
facturing screw conveyors used in coal mining extended beyond the patent
term.401 Metal Products was a competitor who used a similar method that
infringed Compton’s patents.402 Metal Products argued that the license pre-
vented the licensee from manufacturing or selling equipment “of the type
licensed.”403 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the agreement amounted to
misuse.404 It did not matter that Metal Products was not a party to the agree-
ment. The important issue was that “[t]he public, in a system of free compe-
tition, is entitled to have the competition of other devices with a patented
device and here it is against that public’s interest to use the patent to sup-
press such competition.”405 This decision resonated with both district and
appellate courts.406
Similarly in Procter & Gamble Co. v. CAO Grp., Inc, in refusing to
dismiss a misuse counterclaim, the district court recognized that “Defendant
‘represents not only [it]self, but, in a sense, also the public which is likewise
excluded from the field of monopoly’ that an in-force patent grants to the
holder. Thus, Defendant’s patent misuse counterclaim enables it to pursue
the remedy of a declaratory judgment that the patents-in-suit are unenforce-
able on behalf of itself and the public, regardless of whether the underlying
patent infringement suit is unilaterally dropped by P & G.”407 In sum, it is
the adverse effect upon the public interest that disqualifies patentees from
maintaining the suit, regardless of whether the particular defendant has suf-
fered from the misuse of the patent.408
400. See id. at *21.
401. Compton v. Metal Prods., Inc., 453 F.2d 38, 44–45 (4th Cir. 1971).
402. Id. at 40–41.
403. See id. at 44.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 45 (citing Mccullough v. Kammerer Corp., 166 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir.
1948)).
406. Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77, 84 (6th Cir. 1971)
(stating that misuse should be actionable even by “one who is not a competitor” because an
infringement suit “is a powerful aid to the maintenance of the attempted monopoly of the
unpatented article, and is thus a contributing factor in thwarting the public policy underlying
the grant of the patent.”); see also Touchett v. E Z Paintr Corp., 150 F. Supp. 384, 388 (E.D.
Wis. 1957) (holding that “[t]he doctrine of misuse of patents involves public policy. It involves
more than the contracting parties. It is for the protection of the public.”).
407. Procter & Gamble Co. v. CAO Grp., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-337, 2013 WL 5353281
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2013) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
408. Petersen v. Fee Int’l, Ltd., 381 F. Supp. 1071, 1081 (W.D. Okla. 1974) (“It is not
material that Plaintiffs were not a party to any of the various agreements and assignments
between Space Tool, Colquitt and Defendants. In their ‘ball of wax’ is patent misuse with an
adverse effect upon the public which disqualifies Defendants from claiming infringement of
[the patent].”); see also Touchett, 150 F. Supp. at 388 (“The doctrine of misuse of patents
involves public policy. It involves more than the contracting parties. It is for the protection of
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Antitrust law also allows those not directly harmed to bring antitrust
suits, “even against an infringer who is not harmed by the abusive prac-
tice.”409 Competitors are proxies for consumer harm, since consumers “do
not realize they are victims of monopolistic practices, or if they do may lack
incentives to bring suit because the harm to an individual consumer may be
tiny even though the aggregate harm is immense.”410 In Ritz Camera Image
LLC v. Sandisk Corp, the Federal Circuit recently recognized that a party not
threatened with an infringement suit had standing to bring an antitrust claim
against the patentee.411 A retailer of patented flash memory chips brought an
antitrust action against the patentee, alleging it had fraudulently procured its
patents.412 Even though the retailer faced not threat of an infringement law-
suit, the Federal Circuit found that it had standing.413 Notably, it also re-
jected the patentee’s assertion “that granting standing to direct purchasers
would trigger a flood of litigation and stem innovation.”414
More generally, the Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Stu-
dents Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures that the wrong alleged by
an interested party “was shared in equal measure by other members of the
community at large, thereby demonstrating that public values can be the
concern of the individual litigant; indeed the case all but suggests that a
‘private attorney-general’ can maintain an action to vindicate the public in-
terest.”415 Thus, granting standing to non-injured parties is not a feature pe-
culiar to misuse or antitrust law.
A judicial interviewee explained that even a rogue infringer does the
public a service by exposing a patentee’s egregious conduct. He remarked
that “it’s different from antitrust law, because it’s not purely competitive
behavior of a private party. It’s somebody who has received something from
the government and they are doing something wrong with it. We should be
happy to know about it and stop it.”416 Broad standing allows the court—as
the public”); Marcello D. De Frenza, Vertical Territorial Restrictions as Patent Misuse, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 215, 219 (1987) (“Since the patent misuse doctrine protects the public at large,
an accused infringer need not prove individual harm from the plaintiff’s misuse”).
409. 6 CHISUM, supra note 382, § 19.01.
410. Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 266–67 (7th Cir. 1984).
411. Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 508 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
412. Id. at 505.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 508 (“As the Court explained, Walker Process claims ‘deal only with a special
class of patents, i.e., those procured by intentional fraud,’ id., and ‘cannot well be thought to
impinge upon the policy of the patent laws to encourage inventions and their disclosure,’ id. at
180, 86 S. Ct. 347 (Harlan, J., concurring). Particularly in light of the demanding proof re-
quirements of a Walker Process claim, we are not persuaded by SanDisk’s ‘flood of litigation’
argument”).
415. Id. at 90 (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973)).
416. LIM, supra note 11, at 191 (“People aren’t just running around bringing actions for
patent issues. Nobody has the time or inclination to do that that I know of. The only time you
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the proxy of the public interest—to consider and reject frivolous allegations
of misuse brought mostly by competitors or licensees while extending their
equitable jurisdiction to arrest abuses of the patent right in appropriate cases.
Broad standing is allowed under misuse for good reason.
C. Punitive Disproportionality
The final key objection to patent misuse is that it disproportionately pe-
nalizes patentees. There are a number of facets to this objection. First, a
successful antitrust plaintiff recovers damages related to the injury sus-
tained.417 In contrast, once a defendant proves misuse, the remedy of unen-
forceability is “set without regard for injury to the infringer or to society.”418
A single offending license clause could render the entire patent or families
of patents unenforceable.419
Second, allowing the misuse defense to exist separately from the anti-
trust laws affords the infringer a dual recovery. Defendants who succesfully
assert misuse are theoretically entitled to file an antitrust counterclaim. Thus,
“[a]ny benefit an infringer receives from proving patent misuse and blocking
an infringement action would be in addition to its antitrust remedies based
on injury.”420 As a result, “the cost of a false positive then becomes very
high.”421 Critics are concerned that judges have no discretion to calibrate the
remedy once misuse has been found.422 An academic interviewed concurred
ever see it is as a distraction from an infringement battle, in my limited experience. There are
real incentives to bring in—the fact that maybe when it’s raised, it’s often not a—‘often’ is the
wrong word to use here—it’s sometimes not raised properly. It’s sort of a throw-everything-
against-the-wall-and-see-what-sticks approach by some infringer scrambling to avoid liability.
Sometimes you get an infringer who is actually doing the public a service by pointing out a
genuine patent misuse. In those circumstances the fact that maybe the infringer has its own
issues—there’s not an unclean hands defense to patent misuse, as far as I know. That reflects
an understanding that if we know somebody is using a grant from the government and using it
wrongfully, we should be happy to know about it.”); see also id. at 191-92 (noting agreement
by other judges interviewed).
417. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured . . . by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained. . . .”).
418. See Lemley, supra note 81, at 1617.
419. Joe Lutzker, Patent Misuse Defence Clarified, ASIALAW (May 2006) available at
http://www.asialaw.com/Article/1971381/Patent-Misuse-Defence-Clarified.html?Print=true&
Single=true (“Misuse defences, if sustained, are especially powerful since they can render
unenforceable an entire family of patents.”).
420. See Lemley, supra note 81, at 1617.
421. Cotter, supra note 114, at 959.
422. Lemley, supra note 105, at 1618 n.121 (“[D]espite its roots, the patent misuse doc-
trine is not one of ‘equitable discretion’; indeed, it does not involve judicial discretion at all.
An infringer who proves misuse is entitled to have the court refuse to aid the patentee. Thus,
any ‘discretion’ the court may possess is only in finding the misuse.”) (citations omitted).
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with the observation that judges were unwilling to find misuse in marginal
cases because of the perceived harshness of the doctrine.423
Third, critics argue that “because the bar on infringement suits continues
until the wrongful consequences have been dissipated fully, a finding of mis-
use essentially gives a green light to infringers of that patent for the foresee-
able future.”424 Although the unenforceability is lifted upon a purging of the
relevant misuse, critics maintain that the burden of purging the misuse may
well be greater than the benefits of pursuing the infringement, and it will
thus deter patentees from enforcing legitimate rights.425 Vincent Chiappetta
warned that “by putting patent owners at a disadvantage relative to other
market participants (who would only be subject to antitrust constraints), mis-
use unnecessarily undermines the value of patents and the innovation poli-
cies pursued by the regime.”426
1. Patent Misuse is about Deterrence
Those arguing for penalizing patentees, with the aim of restoring de-
fendants to a position where they would have been “but for” the misuse,
miss the point. Patent misuse was designed to have a deterrent effect, and it
is less concerned with reversing an improperly accrued market benefit.427
Judge Giles Rich noted that “[t]he misuse doctrine was a special form of
punishment devised for over-reaching patentees who were using their pat-
ents to monopolize something other than the invention.”428 A judge inter-
viewed remarked:
423. LIM, supra note 11, at 195.
424. See Lemley, supra note 105, at 1619–20 (“Overdeterrence imposes substantial costs
on protected activity that might mistakenly be construed as misuse, both because of uncer-
tainty over the exact scope of the law and because of risk aversion.”).
425. See Sean Michael Aylward, Copyright Law: The Fourth Circuit’s Extension of the
Misuse Doctrine to the Area of Copyright: A Misuse of The Misuse Doctrine?—Lasercomb
America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 661, 694 (1992) (“[I]n many cases the
burden of purging the misuse will be greater than recovering for the infringement.”); Cotter,
supra note 114, at 960 (noting the possible negative effects of nonenforceability: “one likely
effect is that IPRs will become less valuable and IP owners less willing to ‘push the envelope’
by extracting borderline concessions.”).
426. Vincent Chiappetta, Living With Patents: Insights from Patent Misuse, 15 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 37 (2011).
427. Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Floral Innovations, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00465-SEB-DK, 2012
WL 4477691, at *5-6 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2012) (noting that there is no need for patentees to
“actually obtain an improper market benefit for there to be actionable patent misuse claim.”).
Distinguishing the rule under antitrust law that “an improper market benefit is a prerequisite to
the success of a rule of reason analysis under antitrust law”, the court found “no such holding
in a non-antitrust case” and concluded that “as a matter of law, actual improper benefit is not a
prerequisite to a claim of patent misuse.” Id.
428. Giles S. Rich, Infringement under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 14 FED.
CIR. B.J. 117, 133 (2005).
382 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 20:299
I don’t think that the doctrine is without use, because at the very
least it would be a way of punishing patentees who engaged in egre-
giously bad behavior that might not be covered by all the other de-
fenses, like invalidity or inequitable conduct, in front of the panel.
So it gives the court one more instrument for preventing serious
injustice or serious abuse. I think that’s very useful. There’s no way
that rules from case law or rules derived from the statute can cover
every factual situation. That’s the value of equity-based doctrines
like patent misuse.429
These observations are consistent with the role of equity in general, for it
was noted long ago that “[a] country can put up with laws that are harsh or
unjust so long as they are administered by just judges who can mitigate their
harshness or alleviate their unfairness.”430 Notwithstanding this, courts do
apply some degree of proportionality in their application of patent misuse.
2. Judicial Sensitivity
Judges tailor the penalty for misuse according to the justice required by
the individual case. At least one appellate court has citied Morton Salt for
the proposition that the misuse defense “is not to be taken as dogmatic and
its application automatic.”431 It explained that denying the successful paten-
tee its remedies “is a harsh remedy, a species of forfeiture.” Another court
attributed this judicial calibration to the fact that a court applying the misuse
defense “sits in equity and is vested with considerable discretion in evaluat-
ing the actions of the patentee.”432 In this way, equity acts as a fair arbiter,
conferring grace upon both patentee and defendant as justice calls for it.
Courts also look to how the patentee treated other actual or potential
licensees in determining if the patentee’s conduct was justified.433 If its con-
duct did not involve improper use, courts will take that into account in deter-
mining whether the patent should be rendered unenforceable.434 In addition,
courts are sensitive to common-sense arguments for restrictions alleged to be
misuse. In Marks v. Polaroid Corp., the First Circuit found the license re-
strictions justified because “reuse by the public generally might spread eye
infection for which perhaps it might be held liable, and in the case of the
429. LIM, supra note 11, at 194.
430. DENNING, supra note 360, at 7.
431. Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1251, 1270 (E.D.
Mich. 1969) aff’d, 440 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1971).
432. Koratron Co. v. Lion Unif., Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
433. See, e.g., Kolene Corp., 440 F.2d at 85.
434. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“What
that requires, at minimum, is that the patent in suit must ‘itself significantly contribute[ ] to the
practice under attack.’”) (alteration in original).
Spring 2014] Patent Misuse and Antitrust 383
temporary viewers, that after one use they were likely to become bent or
dirty and hence lose some it not all of their effectiveness.”435
Surprisingly, courts have exercised their discretion—even upon finding
misuse—not to impose the remedy of unenforceability where the impact
would be “too drastic.”436 One court recently regarded unenforceability as
too harsh in close cases and factored the misuse into the balancing test in
determining whether to grant an injunction instead.437 Another was willing to
sever the offending clause from the rest of the patent.438 This last result in
effect implemented Thomas Cotter’s proposal that cases should distinguish
between “transactional and litigation misuse,” with the patent being rendered
unenforceable only in the latter case, while the former case results only in
the unenforceability for the offending contractual provision.439
Regarding the concern over double recovery, courts retain their full dis-
cretion in determining whether to allow a compounding of patent misuse and
antitrust against the patentee. In Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., the Second
Circuit found that denying the patentee “recovery on the ground of misuse is
a sufficient vindication of antitrust policy, at least where the patentee is no
435. Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 237 F.2d 428, 436 (1st Cir. 1956).
436. Ethyl Corp. v. Hercules Powder Co., 232 F. Supp. 453, 458 (D. Del. 1963) (“Al-
though Ziegler attempted to do that which he was incapable of legitimately doing, the applica-
tion of the doctrine of misuse is too drastic.”).
437. Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Masimo Corp., No. 00-6506 MRP (AJWx), 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28518, at *106 n.34 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2004) (“Courts have frequently denied injunc-
tions in cases of patent misuse, because granting the injunction would give the patent holder a
monopoly that extends beyond the scope of the patent. Patent misuse has not been alleged in
this case and this Court does not assume that any misuse has occurred. Nevertheless, this case
is analogous to patent misuse cases in that the injunction Masimo proposes would, because of
the nature of the oximetry market, expand its monopoly beyond the monopoly to which its
patents give Masimo a right.”) (citation omitted).
438. Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 310, 336-37 (D. Del. 2010)
(“[E]ven assuming that Cordance’s contractual agreements did constitute patent misuse per se
under Brulotte, it does not follow that the court need render the ’710 patent unenforceable in
its entirety. The court might invalidate only the post-expiration passive royalties. And here,
any final extension that would put the GSP Agreement beyond the term of the ’710 patent has
not yet been and might never be exercised.”); see also BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note
78, at 279 (“[M]isuse is an equitable judge-made doctrine that can have a suitably tailored
judge-made remedy. . . . If the misuse remedy is limited to nonenforcement of offensive provi-
sions that do not have a good efficiency explanation, then an error in estimating foreclosure
will not be exclusively costly.”).
439. Cotter, supra note 114, at 903 (“Only [litigation misuse] should result in unenforce-
ability of the patent or copyright for the duration of the misuse; [transactional misuse] should
result only in unenforceability of the offending contractual provision—and whatever other
sanctions, if any, are appropriate as a matter of antitrust or other law.”); see also id. at 963-64
(“[I]n cases involving transactional misuse, the penalty should be limited to nonenforceability
of the challenged provision; this reform would impose a standing requirement that is, by most
accounts, absent from the current system and would in effect merge misuse with preemption
analysis. For litigation misuse . . . the unenforceability penalty may continue to be one, though
perhaps not the only, option available to deter abusive litigation. So reformed, misuse would
continue to play a modest, but useful, role in copyright and patent litigation.”).
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longer actively engaging in antitrust violations at the time he brings his
suit.”440 On the facts, although the effects of the patentee’s violations had not
been dissipated, it had ceased “actively engaging in at least its most objec-
tionable antitrust violations.”441 Under those circumstances, the infringer
was denied treble damages for the costs of defending the patentee’s suit.442 A
judge interviewed confirmed this, noting that the consequences of misuse
and antitrust are different.443
Patent misuse is an affirmative defense. This prevents it from becoming
a tool of unscrupulous third parties masquerading as roving avengers of the
public interest.444 While misuse may be invoked by declaratory judgments, it
featured in only about 7% of misuse cases between 1953 and 2012, com-
pared to 8% in litigated patent cases generally.445 Recent scholarship has
noted that infringers may choose to settle and pay royalties rather than de-
fend an infringement suit and challenge the validity of the patent.446
Those worried about the floodgates argument should be mollified by the
chorus of judges interviewed, who note that the only people to use the de-
fense are those who have been sued for infringement, or are at risk of being
sued. Both the scope of unenforceability as well as the discretion the judge
has in deciding whether patent misuse exists, should serve as a check against
frivolous claims. As a matter of judicial economy, one commentator noted
that parties were “always already in court” in a misuse case.447 It follows that
“adjudicating such a defense should add incrementally less,” and “courts can
dismiss unmeritorious misuse defenses early in the litigation . . . [and]
should help to prevent parties from illegitimately holding up their competi-
tors via the misuse defense.”448
Finally, unenforceability is temporary. Once patentees purge their mis-
use, they regain all rights to enforce their patents.449 If the conduct or con-
440. Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 448 F.2d 872, 883 (2d Cir. 1971).
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. LIM, supra note 11, at 197 (“If you’re suing somebody for infringement and they
counterclaim, they might defend on patent misuse and they might also counterclaim saying
that it’s an antitrust violation. If they succeed on the patent misuse, they will win on the
infringement. If they succeed on antitrust, they will get treble damages. I don’t see that as
getting hit twice. It’s getting hit for two different things. One gives you a defense to infringe-
ment. The other gives you a remedy for a violation of a statute.”).
444. Chiappetta, supra note 426, at 18 (“Neither those whose actions have not been chal-
lenged by the patent owner nor the government have standing to affirmatively attack possible
patent owner over-reaching.”).
445. LIM, supra note 11, at 313.
446. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Pat-
ents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent
Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 954-55 (2004).
447. See Note, supra note 70, at 1938.
448. Id. at 1938-39.
449. See, e.g., Preformed Line Prods. Co. v. Fanner Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 265, 278 (6th
Cir. 1964); see also Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corp., 443 F.2d 867,
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tractual provision were improper, its cancellation before suit qualifies the
plaintiffs to maintain their lawsuits.450 Given that the doctrine itself is sound,
what more can judges and attorneys do?
VI. WHAT JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS CAN DO
Early on in 1968, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the success or failure
of patent misuse lay with the courts. In McCullough Tool Co. v. Well
Surveys, Inc., it analogized misuse to antitrust defenses and cited with ap-
proval a report by the Attorney General’s National Committee to study the
Antitrust Laws which noted that antitrust law was “basically a problem of
judicial control,” and recommended “that the courts should make full use of
their powers to curb such attempts to defeat justice.”451  Judges interviewed
remarked that they were open to finding misuse where the circumstances
warranted it.
“It’s all a question of what the litigators present,” one judge commented.
“If it’s well tried, with evidentiary support below, it will be taken seriously.
If it’s not well tried below and well presented on appeal, it probably won’t
get much traction.” To him, it was “entirely the choice and ability of the
litigators,” and “not some attitudinal posture by one or more judges.”452 Un-
fortunately, he noted that ““misuse is routinely and carelessly alleged in a lot
of cases and then not seriously pursued.”453 If this is representative of a
wider phenomenon, then litigators need to develop a more thoughtful basis
for their misuse arguments.
Litigators should also be mindful of forum selection. As a judge inter-
viewed noted, this “has as much a role to play in determining the future
shape of patent misuse as any other factor—for example, a forum that recog-
nizes that patentees are self-interested individuals with incentives to sue
even on shaky grounds, and that acknowledges the limited capabilities of the
U.S. Patent Office, will be more receptive to expanding patent misuse.”454
Conversely, a forum that believes robust patent rights are necessary would
be less receptive to misuse allegations.455
883 (2d Cir. 1971); Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., No. 93-0006-H, 1996 WL 335381
(W.D. Va. May 29, 1996).
450. See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488,  493 (1942) (“Equity may
rightly withhold its assistance from such a use of the patent by declining to entertain a suit for
infringement, and should do so at least until it is made to appear that the improper practice has
been abandoned and that the consequences of the misuse of the patent have been dissipated.”).
451. McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 395 F.2d 230, 240 (10th Cir. 1968).
See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases must, of necessity expound and interpret the rule.”).
452. LIM, supra note 11, at 200.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 87.
455. Id. at 87-88.
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An interviewee noted that even with the Federal Circuit’s dominance,
“the district court’s ability to broker a settlement remains potent.”456 This
gives misuse more vitality that may seem apparent. In particular, respect
judges could leverage a colorable misuse case to push parties toward settle-
ment by making risk-adverse patentees choose to settle on terms it has more
control over and the risk of losing on appeal.457 These settlements, he sug-
gested, may be favorable to defendants. Conceivably, such outcomes could
leave defendants better off than they would be given the calibration of rights
dictated under current precedent.
Cases from the Ninth Circuit like Kimble highlight the potential of other
circuits in shaping the boundaries of patent misuse in licensing disputes,
which make up most of the patent misuse cases studied.458 At the same time,
despite recent challenges to the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over
patent appeals,459 it is unlikely that its dominant influence will wane in the
foreseeable future. As the nation’s patent court, the Federal Circuit is best
placed to coordinate the revival of misuse in a controlled manner. That revi-
val is timely, given widespread concern about litigation abuses by some
patentees.460
The Federal Circuit is the only specialist patent court in America, and
one of few in the world staffed by judges whose decisions are informed by
the work of law clerks who have at least college-level technical back-
456. Id. at 166 n.50 (“Even if you have a Federal Circuit, which is strong and has these
other things, there’s room for a district court judge to manoeuvre, wiggle room, to talk the talk
in a way that could lead to a settlement, rather than have—because they get it wrong—I mean,
right now I have this little guy . . . But they’ll get him out of the picture, because yes, the
chances are that the Federal Circuit is going to go my way, but who knows what panel will be
in the Federal Circuit, what they can do?”).
457. Id. at 166 n.51 (“It doesn’t need a lot of decided cases. As long as it’s there and
judges say those words—‘to me, Mr Jones, this looks like a patent misuse case. That’s the way
I’m going here. I just want you to know that. And I’m going to allow even more discovery into
that aspect of the case’—those words are going to be, I would say, nine out of ten times,
leading to a settlement that’s much better for that party in a way that they are going to do all
right. We don’t see that in just-decided cases. So that has that vitality.”).
458. See LIM, supra note 11, at 370 fig.6.64 (showing tying, licensing restrictions, roy-
alty-related misuse and time extensions as four of the five most frequently adjudicated types of
misuse).
459. See Diane P. Wood, Is it Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdic-
tion in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 9 (2013); see also Edward Reines, In
Defense of the Federal Circuit: A Response to Judge Wood, PATENT DOCS (Oct 7, 2013), http:/
/www.patentdocs.org/2013/10/in-defense-of-the-federal-circuit-a-response-to-judge-wood.
html.
460. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013) (intended to address patent
infringement litigation abuse.); Gene Quinn, Chief Judge Rader Speaks Out about Patent Liti-
gation Abuse, IP WATCHDOG (Feb 28, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/02/28/chief-
judge-rader-speaks-out-about-patent-litigation-abuse/id=36252/ (Chief Judge Randall Rader of
the Federal Circuit acknowledging “there is a litigation abuse problem.”).
Spring 2014] Patent Misuse and Antitrust 387
grounds.461 At least in theory, a good understanding of the technology allows
practitioners and law clerks to brief the panel on the sector-specific techno-
logical landscape in a thoughtful manner. This informed explanation thus
enables the panel to appreciate more fully both whether the conduct question
crosses the misuse threshold as well as the potential consequences of finding
misuse. It is a common-sense measure to restore the primacy of patent policy
familiar to these stakeholders, rather than to encumber patent litigation with
unfamiliar and costly antitrust analysis.
Actavis has made it clear that both patent and antitrust policies are rele-
vant in determining patent scope. For patent misuse, this means the rule of
reason-type analysis will continue to feature in its jurisprudence, and so
should patent policy. Writing before Actavis and Kimble, Mark Lemley
noted that “[s]ince the patent misuse doctrine has a policy foundation sepa-
rate from the antitrust laws, there is no theoretical bar to the creation of non-
antitrust classes of patent misuse.”462
Patent policy remains a rich, untapped vein in patent misuse despite its
Supreme Court pedigree in Morton Salt. The ultimate goal of the patent
system is to promote the public good by providing a proper incentive to
innovate and disclose their inventions. The antitrust laws, in contrast, are
aimed at fostering competition in a free market society by preventing mo-
nopolies and unreasonable restraints of trade. If patent misuse is seen as
being predicated on a finding of antitrust policy alone, its potential as a
policy lever would be much diminished and there would never be a role for
patent misuse. Once antitrust fails, so too would a misuse doctrine that is
coupled to antitrust.
At the lower level, district judges would likely be more comfortable
with patent policy than antitrust policy. This is so even though the theoreti-
cal distinctions within antitrust law may be more settled, such as those relat-
ing to price effects. Both as an equitable doctrine and a defense to patent
infringement, it is more familiar and more easily administrable by district
judges, who would likely welcome the opportunity to avoid having to con-
tend with complex economic considerations under the antitrust matrix, in
addition to those inherent in any patent infringement trial. It is worth noting
Judge Walker’s advice that because many generalist judges lack training in
461. One survey of patent attorneys, for example, showed that more than 30 percent of
patent attorneys in the biological field had a PhD, while more than 25 percent of those in the
chemical field had a PhD. See Dennis Crouch, Preliminary Results on Patent Law Survey.,
PATENTLY-O (August 25, 2010), available at http://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/08/preliminary-
results-on-patent-law-survey.html. Even in the electrical, mechanical and computer engineer-
ing fields, where the number of PhDs is significantly lower, practitioners had technical under-
graduate degrees. Id.
462. See Lemley, supra note 105, at 1611–12 (footnote omitted).
388 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 20:299
economic analysis, evidence should be comprehensibly communicated to a
generalist in a manner consistent with other evidence.463
Like every tool, patent misuse may itself be misused. Its flexibility can
devolve into debilitating uncertainty. Its overlap with antitrust law can be-
come a flimsy cantilever, and as its distinct mission to safeguard patent pol-
icy vanishes, so will it. Punitively applied, it will realize its detractors’ worst
fears. Prudently applied, it may yet prove itself to be a keen and incisive
scalpel capable of complimenting the rougher cuts of the antitrust laws. The
vitality of patent misuse ultimately depends on those it was created by and
for—the judges themselves. If the reinvigoration of patent misuse takes
place, it will likely be a compromise: balancing innovation and fairness in
dealing with competitors and consumers with commercial certainty and ro-
bust exclusionary rights and, thus, encourage the continued production and
exploitation of inventions that enrich our daily lives.
VII. CONCLUSION
Actavis suggests that the pendulum is swinging toward a post-Chicagoan
era of greater intervention under the antitrust laws. The true legacy of Ac-
tavis lies in the promise of catalyzing those from the patent and antitrust
spheres into moving towards a realistic compromise on how the rules that
affect them both should look like and function.464 A measured revitalization
may bring relief to antitrust defendants. Courts, wary of the treble damages
and private litigation under antitrust laws, may prefer a more graduated re-
sponse of temporary unenforceability under patent misuse.
Kimble shows the Chicago School of antitrust continues to be very much
part of the conventional wisdom on patent misuse. Advocates of a more
balanced analysis that also includes patent policy would do well to follow
the majority’s example in Actavis and reexamine cases applying that policy
to the facts before them. Indeed, patent misuse quintessentially represents
the patent-antitrust interface. Although its past is rooted in patent law, its
present is intertwined with the antitrust laws.
We have come a long way in developing a better understanding of both
patent misuse and the patent-antitrust interface. But we should regard the
present not as a pinnacle of achievement, but as a base to scale new
463. See generally Vaughn R. Walker, Merger Trials: Looking for the Third Dimension,
5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 35 (2009).
464. Shubha Ghosh, Convergence?, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 95, 104 (2014) (“What
keeps the opinion from perhaps being a great one there was [that there was] no consideration
of the competing policies with an attempt to reconcile them. While the dissent takes for
granted the opposing policies of patent and antitrust, the majority states that this tension is an
assumption rather than a reasoned conclusion.”).
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heights.465 Through debate, experimentation, and refinement innate in the
common law, future cases can craft pieces that will form a coherent analyti-
cal framework for the interface between the patent and antitrust laws. The
effort must be supported by clear-headed constituents who look beyond the
rhetoric and translate economic insights into workable legal rules.
465. Goh Keng Swee, A Holy Order to Scale New Heights, in GOH KENG SWEE: A LEG-
ACY OF PUBLIC SERVICE 311, 316 (Emrys Myles Khean Aun Chew and Chong Guan Kwa eds.,
2013), available at http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/9789814390767_bmatter.

